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ABSTRACT
Ethiopia currently enacted a Trade Competition and Consumer Protection law in 2013 that
established an autonomous Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority an institution
responsible for the implementation competition law. Among other things, the law entitled the
Authority with the powers of investigation, prosecution and adjudication. Besides these
investigative, prosecution and adjudicative organs under the Authority, the law also established
an appellate tribunal named the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate
Tribunal.
Organizationally, the three organs of the Authority are under the direct and mandates of the
Authority. They are not entitled with their own independence and status of ajuristic person, like
the experiences of other jurisdictions. Moreover, the Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection law does not clearly define the independence and accountability of the Federal Trade
Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal. Structurally to whom the tribunal is
accountable and issues related with administration of tribunal judges are not indicated under the
law.
The multiplicity of powers and functions held by the Authority qualify it as "Government in
Miniature" due to the consolidation of powers of investigation, prosecution and adjudication it
enjoy. This paper evaluates issues related with those of power consolidated monopolistically on
the mandate of the Authority by the law and argues that the issues like independence,
accountability, check and balance, fairness and as a result the notion of rule of law are not
addressed well in the competition law in order to facilitate a fully fledged enforcement of the
competition cases.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1.1. Background of the Study
The governments in developed market economies rely on competition policy to prevent
excessive use of economic power by offering choice to purchasers, exposing an individual's
power to restrain by rival's power, and motivating companies to become more efficient.' The
idea of having competition regimes started to take shape in North America and Europe in the 19th
century in response to the demands of democratization and industrialization. These both
continents recognized the potential benefits of competition and potential harms of unrestrained
economic freedom.'
The adoption of a competition law by different countries, especially developing and transitional
economies has experienced an unprecedented growth since 1990s. However, the degree of
success of enforcing competition law in the majority of developing countries was relatively low.
Competition is of overwhelming importance for the functioning of market economies. It is this
deriving force that facilitates countries of the world to have a competition law and enforcing
institution.
On the need of having a competition laws enforcing institution, the key institutional framework
questions like who investigates and initiates a competition action, what body adjudicates
contested competition proceeding, does a branch of the enforcement agency adjudicates or is
there a completely independent and special tribunal are the main policy issues that will come
immediately on the mind of policy makers.
1 . Solomon Abay, 2009, Designing the Regulatory Roles of Government in Business: The lessons from
Theory, International Practice and Ethiopia's Policy Path, Journal of Ethiopian Law, vo1.23 No.2, P.87
2 • Ibid, p.88
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-Since the EPRDF coming to the power, the political economy shuffle from the socialistic
oriented ideology to free market economy thereafter market based economic activities have
become increasingly evident that derives the country to turn her face to have a defmed
competition policy and law. Accordingly, the country enacted the first competition law of the
Trade Practice Proclamation of 2003. This proclamation authorized the then Ministry of Trade
and Industry (MoTI) to deal with enforcement of the law. An investigation commission, under
the MoTI was established to monitor the day to day implementation of the law. The competition
commission set as part and parcel of the ministerial line. Due to its institutional framework draw
backs that make it as one department of the MoTI and the need to have a competition authority
with a more autonomous power that can enforce competition cases independently from the then
MoTI become a reason for the Trade Practice Proclamation of 2003 to be repealed by the
succeeding Proclamation Trade Practice and Consumer Protection of2010.
The Trade Practice and Consumer proclamation of the 2010 envisages a significantly different
institutional framework involving a more autonomous "Federal Competition Authority" and
unlike the Trade Practices proclamation it apportioned the tasks of investigation and adjudication
with the MoTI and the Competition Authority. Other than integrating consumer protection right
with competition cases, the proclamation tried its best to separate those distinct procedures like
investigation, Prosecution and adjudication, followed in distinct expertise knowledge and
facilitated the regime for a better check and balance between the MoTI and the Authority.
In order to ensure the enforcement of trade competition and protection of consumers' right,
currently Ethiopia has adopted a specific law dealing with trade competition and consumer
protection Proclamation No.813/2013. This law institutionally entitles the Competition Authority
with immense power and functions. Other than policy advocacy, powers of investigation,
institution of action (prosecution) and adjudication are responsibilities of the Authority with its
various organs. Moreover, the law established an appellate tribunal whose structural
independence and accountability is not clearly defined. In a simple word the Authority is given
with a consolidated power of investigator, prosecutor and judge on the cases it entertains and
driving it of the problem lack of objectivity. This aggregation of power under the mandate ofthe
Authority also be point of contention for independence ofthose separated organs, accountability,
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check and balance system between the organs, fairness and rule of law. Further the
administration issues of both the adjudicative benches ofthe Authority and the Federal Appellate
Tribunal judges are not made clear. In addition to this, the Authority's independence by itself is
not effective due to loose accountability of the institutions. Accountability in most cases are
manifested by supervision, evaluation and reporting to the structurally superior organs of the
government. The law in this regard does not expressly define in what manner the accountability
ofthe Authority to the MoT realized.
The main focus of this paper is, therefore, to evaluate issues related with consolidation of power
of investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the mandate of the Authority. Moreover,
there will be discussion on the experiences of other jurisdictions regarding to the issue.
Accordingly, the experiences and institutional frameworks of France, Republic of South Africa,
Australia and India are selected on different criteria for a comparison purpose. And the paper is
organized in four chapters. Chapter one of the thesis will discuss about the general backgrounds
of the study as an introductory remarks. Thus, background of the study, statement of the
problem, the scope of the study, objectives, significance, research methodology, limitations of
the study and literature review would be highlighted.
Chapter two of the thesis is designed to help the reader better understand on the conceptual
framework of competition and competition law and policy. This chapter tries to sketch the
conceptual and definitional features and the essence (economics) of the regime, objectives and
policy issues of competition system.
Chapter three deals with comparative analysis of the institutional framework and legal regimes
of the Ethiopian trade competition and consumer protection Authority. In this chapter an
overview on the institutional framework of competition authorities, their organizational structure,
power and functions, including the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection
Authority, are discussed. Besides power and function of the Ministry of Trade (MoT) is also
discussed briefly. In light of institutional framework/design a comparative analysis of other
jurisdictions like France, Republic of South Africa (RSA), Australia and India is the theme of
this section.
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Chapter four is devoted in evaluating issues related with consolidation of investigation,
prosecution and adjudication powers under the Ethiopian competition Authority. This chapter
being the core of the research explores about the issues associated with consolidation of power of
investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the competition authority. Accordingly,
organizational independence of the organs of the Authority, independence of the tribunal judges
of the adjudicative benches of the competition authority and the Federal Appellate Tribunal, the
procedural fairness and rule of law, the availability of accountability and check and balance
between the three organs of the Authority is the main concern. Finally, a section of conclusion
and recommendations is provided towards the end of the Paper. This section tries to briefly
summarize the conclusions and culminates with the part dealing with the outlined
recommendations.
1.2. Statement of the problem
The last few decades have seen huge changes in the way developing countries manage their
economies.' Most governments in such countries have moved away from central planning
towards supporting a market economy and allowing the growth of local, privately owned
business. During these times countries have adopted or are in the process of enacting competition
laws. There is growing awareness among these countries of the adverse effects of anti-
competitive practices on their economies as well as their populations. The effects of such
practices are not questionable. Nevertheless, developing countries have come to recognize the
potential benefits that can be derived from competition law enforcement. The drive to establish
legal and institutional frameworks in order to fight anti-competitive practices has intensified in
recent decades.
Ethiopia being one of the developing country, is taking a solid action from enacting a
competition law, trade competition and consumer protection proclamation No.813/2013
(hereinafter the Proclamation), to establishment of competition law enforcing institution. The
2013 trade competition and consumer protection, unlike its predecessor Trade Practice and
3. Even in Africa it is evident looking the economic change and development in countries, for instance,
Nigeria, Botswana, Ethiopia, and the like.
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Consumer protection Proclamation, under its preamble states that the enactment of this
proclamation is that the need to determine the powers and duties of the concerned organs that
will be in charge of the responsibility to carryon investigation, prosecution and judicial
responsibility in order to ensure the implementation ofthe proclamation.
However, the proclamation other than giving a due attention to the efficiency of economy or
market competition as an objective, additionally it also ensures protecting the business
community from anti-competitive and unfair market practices, and consumers from misleading
market conducts, and establishing a system that is conducive for the promotion of competitive
free market, ensuring that consumers get goods and services safe and suitable to their health and
equivalent to the price they pay and accelerating the economic development as an objective of
the competition law.4 For the implementation of the laws ofthe proclamation enacted in line with
the objectives listed hereinbefore, the institution trade competition and consumer protection
Authority is assigned with those consolidated specific duties.'
Within certain systems, the competition authority brings enforcement actions before the court,
which acts as final decision-maker with respect to alleged breaches of the competition rules. In
other systems, the competition authority itself is empowered to take infringement decisions, and
the courts provide an appeal mechanism or review function for such administrative decisions."
This implies that countries are free to follow design choices available for the institutional
framework. Institutional framework concerned, for instance, the United Nation (UN) Model Law
on Competition (2010) - Revised Chapter XI provides generally three 7 structural models."
4. Proclamation No.813/2013, The Federal Negarit Gazeta of The Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, 20th Year No.28, Addis Ababa, zi- March, 2014, Art.3.
5 . See, part five of the trade competition and consumer protection proclamation. Accordingly, the
consolidated power includes: investigation, institution of action and adjudication of cases.
6 . Procedural Fairness: Competition Authorities, Courts and Recent Developments, 2011, OECD Policy
Roundtables, p.ll, available at,
http://search.myway.com/search/ GGmain.jhtrnl?searchfor=procedural + faireness%3A + Competition +Auth
orities%2C+courts+and+recent+development+oecd+pdf , (accessed at 23, Mar. 2015)
7 . (a) The bifurcated judicial model - the Authority has investigative powers, and must bring enforcement
actions before courts of general jurisdiction, with rights of appeal to general appellate courts;
(b) The bifurcated agency model- the Authority has investigative powers, and must bring enforcement
actions before specialized competition adjudicative authorities, with rights of appeal to further specialized
appellate bodies or to general appellate courts;
(c) The integrated agency model- the Authority is empowered with both investigative and adjudicative
functions, with rights of appeal to general or specialized appellate bodies. See also, UN Model Law on
Competition Law cited infra note 12
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In this context the Ethiopian Trade competition and Consumer Protection proclamation loads the
enforcement power, a competition cases concerned, only on a single independent organ, i.e. the
Authority. The Authority is established as an autonomous organ ofthe government with its legal
personality and given with tasks of conducting investigation, institution of action and
adjudication of competition cases. All the tasks that are furnished in a specific judicial system by
separated organ of the government are completely in a whole-sale extent occupied and enforced
by the Authority. Therefore, in what manner the tribunal judges are impartial and in what
measurement the authority become successful by enforcing all justice system in single roof? On
the hand, how far the independence of the Authority with regard to the cases it adjudicates on the
mere fact that its accountability to the MoT? In this regard, for all practical matter the Authority
is judiciary.
In addition, establishment of a special tribunal, other than regular courts of law, needs various
goals. Accordingly, cases dispensed in this special tribunal presumed adjudicated by well
experienced professionals with law, economics and in the field of commerce, however, the
proclamation is silent regarding as to structural independence and accountability of the appellate
tribunal. It also does not specifically define the manner of governance of the tribunal judges
under the Authority, so that it will be independent and accountable adjudicative tribunal.
When the trends of other jurisdictions are observed, in fact, there are various fashions in the
organization of the competition agency, especially, in case of judicial power and investigative
duty of the cases. In this regard lessons will be taken in case there is a well and independent
competition agency for the efficient judicial power implementation. As compared to other
jurisdictions, the Ethiopian Trade competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation regarding
to its institutional framework it does not made various organs of the Authority, especially, the
Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication organs independent rather they are consolidated
under the single Competition Authority. Moreover, other than establishing the Federal Appellate
8. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Model Law on Competition (2010) - Revised
Chapter XI, Geneva 2011, p.3, available at,
http: ; ; search. myway. com; search; GGmain.jh tml?searchfor=the+independence+o f+tribunal +judges +of+co
mpetition+authority+of+republic+of+south+ Africa+pdf , (accessed at, 22, Mar. 2015)
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Tribunal the law does not entitle the institution with de-jure and de-facto independence and also
the administration issues of tribunal judges are a point of controversy. Therefore, this study will
evaluate those issues like independence, accountability, efficient check and balance system,
procedural fairness, rule of law and administration of tribunal judges under the consolidated
power format ofthe Authority with a comparative basis of other jurisdictions.
1.3. The scope of the study
The whole study is concerned with evaluating issues like independence, impartiality,
accountability, check and balance system within the organs of the Authority, fairness which is
related with consolidation of investigation, prosecution and adjudication powers the Ethiopian
competition authority. The scope of this study thus limited to the issue of evaluating institutional
framework/design and judicial power emanated from the trade competition and consumer
protection proclamation to the federal trade competition and consumer protection authority.
Moreover, the study also includes the ministry of Trade (MoT) as it is a main stakeholder in
implementation of the competition laws and the judicial system in trade competition and
consumer protection proclamation.
In addition, the practice which is evident in other jurisdictions in light of institutional and judicial
independence and the consolidation of power at the hands of the authority are analyzed in
contrast with the Ethiopian competition law enforcement and the institution itself Consequently,
the competition laws and authorities of France, South Africa, Australia and India were made
part of the study. As far as the geographical limit ofthe study concerned, the information will be
collected from the Federal Trade competition and Consumer Protection Authority, the Ministry
ofIndustry (MoT), and the Federal high court as well.
1.4. Objective of the Study
The primary objective of conducting this piece of paper is to assess problems associated with
consolidation of power and independence issues under the Trade competition and Consumer
Protection Authority enshrined with the proclamation and to assess the extent trade competition
and consumer protection proclamation shields the independence of various organs of the
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Authority for all its activities and administration of judges. And specific objectives of the study
are; to assess the administration issue of tribunal judges as a factor that hinders the judicial
efficiency due to lack of independence and impartiality, to assess the independence of
competition Authority tribunal judges as it conform with the notion of independence of the
regular court judges, to assess the competition authority tribunal judges as an impartial
dispensers of justice and handing down rule-based decisions, to assess whether there is influence
from the government through the Director General on the organs of the competition Authority
and finally, to come up with possible solutions with a view to address the shortfalls which are
assessed by the study.
The writer of this paper chooses specific issues like the question of independence of the
institution and tribunal judges of the authority and the effect of power consolidation on the hands
ofthe Authority, because ofthe following objectives:
• Examining the current organizational structure, i.e. consolidation of investigative,
prosecution and adjudicative power under single roof of the Competition Authority in
light of organizational independence. Because independence is the primary requirement
for every institutions serving as judiciary.
• Evaluating whether there is internal and external check and balance system within the
three organs (investigation, prosecution and adjudication) of the authority. Consolidations
of those powers like investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the single
Authority without a check and balance system may cause for the breach of fundamental
rights of individuals and it is also contrary to rule of law.
• Evaluating how and in what manner the relationship between the Competition Authority
and Ministry of Trade workout. As per the competition cases the Authority is entitled to
adjudicate cases fall under its jurisdiction by its Adjudicative benches and take
administrative measures. These judicial and decisional tasks should be enforced
impartially and independently so that the Authority's de-facto independence is really
manifested. The de-jure independence to be realized the accountability of the Authority
to MoT should be expressly known.
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• Evaluating administrative relationship between the Director General and the tribunal
judges and the manner on which the tribunal judges are governed under the competition
proclamation of the country. Administrative issues are crucial for the professionals to be
impartial and independent of their judicial career. Unless governance issues under the
Authority is clearly known, tribunal judges to the Authority face lack of job guarantee
and this will as a result made judges to be influenced by the higher officials of the
Authority on the cases they are adjudicating.
• Since the current Trade Competition and Consumer Protection proclamation is the
newcomer and enough research on this area is not done. The Ethiopian competition
proclamations are known by their lack of stability. Since 2003 till 2013 the competition
laws are amended for about three times. And all amendments have their own strong and
weak sides; therefore, regarding institutional design what the current competition
proclamation look like is the idea that is not addressed by any research.
So, the paper evaluates the issues related with the consolidation of power on the competition
Authority regarding to its investigative, prosecution and adjudication power and institutional and
tribunal judges' independence and accountability issues and other jurisdictions practice in the
issues are analyzed for the purpose of in sighting a well formed independent enforcement
institution of competition laws and to have efficient and effective competition system follow
procedural fairness and respect rule of law with a check and balance format.
1.5. Significance of the Study
The significance of the study may be seen from the perspectives of those who are affected or
benefited by the operation of the current competition law and consumer protection. In this
context the business community, consumers and the government itself are the one from the
beneficiaries. The paper recommends important points regarding to the institutional organization
of the competition Authority as per its institutional framework and judicial independence. The
tribunal judges to the competition authority seem not independent and accountable
administratively and professionally. Moreover, the Appellate Tribunal is not clearly defmed as it
is structurally independent and accountable. This is a great problem to entertainment of cases
impartially.
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The proclamation overloads the Authority with all judicial tasks that may be alien for the most
jurisdictions and incompatible for the justice system and it is eroding fairness and rule of law
principles. Therefore, by recommending the possible suitable institutional organization as per to
the institutional and judicial independence and then the business community, consumers and
also the government will be benefited because of strong institutional and judicial independence
and appropriate judicial system installation in competition system that hosts various cases that
come from the current ample economic transaction and development.
The paper is also important for the law making organ to reconsider the Trade competition and
Consumer Protection Proclamation in force by showing the gaps concerning the problems of
consolidation of power and institutional and judicial independence of the Trade competition and
Consumer Protection Authority.
1.6. Research Methodology
The selection of the methodology is based on what kind of information is sought, from whom
and under what circumstances. As the title of the research tells us the study is conducted by
evaluation of some issues of measurements like institutional and professional independence,
accountability, check and balance system, fairness and administration of judges. As a result,
there is no a short and fast rule only to stick on a specific method in order to conduct the
investigation of the study. The general trend in this regard is that using more than one method
can output a good result, even if it adds some workload other than the need oftime and financial
resource.
On the above background, the methods used in this research was a qualitative research and a sort
of multiple methods are applied that including primary sources like interview and secondary
sources including various written materials and legislations.
1.6.1. Sources of Data
The information for this study was gathered from both primary and secondary sources of data.
The primary sources of data for this study are gathered through interview from the Federal Trade
competition and Consumer Protection Authority Research and Study Directorate, Adjudicative
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benches tribunal judges, Federal Appellate Tribunal Judges, Investigation and Prosecution
Directorate and other staffs. Also from the Ministry ofIndustry (MoT) law professional staffs, as
a respondent. Accordingly, two judges from the Federal Appellate Tribunal, one judge from
Adjudicative benches of the Authority and generally three judges are interviewed. Additionally,
including Directorate Directors three staffs from the Authority and one staff member from MoT
four personnels are interviewed.
The secondary sources of data are gathered from various books, journals and publications are
also be used to review the literature and to support research fmdings.
1.6.2. Sampling Technique and Data Gathering Instruments
In selecting the concerned participants, the researcher in conducting the study has employed
purposive sampling technique based on the interviewees' experience, position, expertise,
education, and other attributes so as to acquire general information capable of addressing the
research questions ofthe study.
In collecting data, the researcher has used interview, documentary analysis, legislative analysis
and literatures. Additionally, documentary resources published or unpublished materials, relevant
internet sources and comparative analysis are made parts of data gathering tools in conducting
the study.
1.6.3. Ethical consideration
In conducting the study, the following ethical considerations have been employed;
~ Consent; all the participants of the study had been requested their free consent before
their participation in the study.
~ Proper acknowledgement; proper acknowledgement have been made to their
contribution to the study.
1.7. Limitation of the study
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On the way of conducting this study the researcher has came across with some limitations, which
tried to affect the outcome of the research. Firstly, due to various factors surrounding them,
informants are not willing to give information freely. The researcher witnessed that some
interviewees' are not confident in order to give information. This lack of confidence springs
from different factors surrounding them. Secondly, the regime of competition being new
phenomenon for the country and also the proclamation being new enactment, still informants are
not as such clear with institutional framework/design of the competition law. Finally, the cases
they have adjudicated being very limited tried to throw some limitations on the results of the
study. But the researcher by consulting various literatures, legislations and experiences of other
jurisdictions has made his effort to minimize the limitations that are faced hereinabove.
1.8. Literature Review
Competition in economic terms denotes the process of rivalry between firms for the patronage of
consumers with a view to achieving a particular business end such as profits or market share. 9
Competition is at the heart of market-based economy.
After the historic event of political transformation, in 1991, Ethiopia became a country with a
liberalized market and an open economic policy. It is evident that since the emergence of the
regime market based economic activities are become increasing.'? In addition to market
liberalization, a ground work for the accession of WTO forced the country to enact a Trade
practice Proclamation (No.329/2002), in April 2002, and which was announced on April 17,
2003 under the Proclamation No.329/2003, to promote competition in the domestic market. I I
However, the need of the enactment of the competition law being the aforementioned reasons, it
is not far from defects which as a result become the cause for its amendment by the succeeding
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.685/2010. Also this proclamation does
9 . Mamo E. Mihretu, Fikremarkos Merso and Kassahun Melese, Final Report, Study on the Impact of the
Trade Related Issues in the Economic Partnership Agreement on Ethiopia, October 2010, Submitted to The
Ministry of Trade of Ethiopia, p.87
10 . Gebremedhine Birega Degaga, et al, competition Regimes in the World - 43 ,Ethiopia, A Civil Society
Report, p.230 , available at,
http://search.myway.com/ searchIGGmain.jhtml?searchfor=competi tion+regimes+in+ the+world-
+ethiopia%2C+a+civil+society+report+pdf, (accessed at, 24, Mar.2015)
11 . Ibid, p.231
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not have a chance to survive more than three year in force. It is also not free from defect which
leads it to be repealed.
As per a book written by a research team'? in titled, "Review of the Legal and Institutional
Framework for Market Competition in Ethiopia", the competition commission under the trade
practice proclamation No.329/2003 has a dual function, i.e. investigation and adjudicatory power
of competition cases.':' The dual function of the competition Commission is no so common a
practice in many countries." The prevalent practice appears to be separation of functions in
different organs. Accordingly, the Trade Practice and consumer protection proclamation
No.685/2010 comes with, may be after having the suggestion of the research team, two
seemingly independent organs, i.e. the MoTI and Competition Authority, with investigative and
adjudicatory powers respectively. This is also evident in other jurisdictions, for instance, in U.S
competition system at the Federal level there are two agencies, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with the power of adjudicatory
and investigation respectively. 15 In fact, the consolidation of power on the competition
commission (under the repealed law) is tried to give a solution by dividing the power to two
organs under the trade practice and consumer protection proclamation 685/2010 (repealed)
competition law. During this time the issue that was not addressed is the problem of
independence. Even the aforementioned research conducted in a team does not address the issue
of independence of the competition Authority and the respective judges of the Authority.
Surprisingly, the current proclamation in force consolidates the power on the hands of the
Authority which was a main reason for the amendment of the trade practice proclamation of
2003. In this regard, this study tries to stick up on evaluating issues related with the consolidation
of power of investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the competition Authority.
12 . The Article, Review of the Legal and Institutional Framework for Market Competition in Ethiopia, is
written by the Research Team including; Fikremarkos Merso(Dr), Imiru Tamirat Yigezu, Seyoum Yohannes,
Yosef Endeshaw and Tilahun Teshome Retta(prof.). available at,
http://search.myway.com/ searchl GGmain.jhtml?searchfor= LLM +thesis+of+the+ethiopian+competition +
law+in+addis+ababa+university+pdf&st=tab&ptb=935E4832 , (accessed day Mar18. 2015)
13 . Fikremarkos Merso, et al, Review of the Legal and Institutional Framework for Market Competition in
Ethiopia, 2009, Produced and distributed by the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral
Associations, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p.82-83
14. Id, at 83
15 . Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, p.341, available at,
http://search.myway.com/search/ GGmain.jhtml?searchfor= US+and+ EU +competition+ law+comparision
+pdf&st, (accessed at, 20, Feb. 2015)
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Accordingly, institutional framework, independence and accountability of organs under the
Authority, the issues of check and balance between the investigative, prosecution and
adjudicative organs of the Authority, procedural fairness and rule of law due to consolidation
powers and administration of tribunal judges to adjudicative benches of the authority and the
Federal Appellate Tribunal are the major concern.
Competition law scholars like Michael J. Trebilcock and Edward M. Iacobucci argue that any
competition-policy institutional regime must address among other things four fundamental
questions.l" First, who investigates and initiates proceedings (including the relative roles of
public and private enforcement)? Second, to the extent that investigation and other enforcement
activities are undertaken by the government, which branch ofthe government is responsible? For
example, the questions of who hires competition policy bureaucrats, to whom are they
accountable, and whether the competition-enforcement body is part of a line ministry or is an
independent agency with its own budget and personnel policies must be addressed. Third, what
body adjudicates contested competition proceedings? Does a branch of the enforcement agency
adjudicate, or is there a completely independent body? What process does the adjudicative body
follow? Finally, to what extent is there judicial review of competition decisionsv."
The Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (ETCCP A) concerned,
however, it is an independent federal government organ having its own legal personality, is
accountable to the Ministry of Trade (MoT).!8 As per the fundamental question as stated above,
in what manner shall the competition policy institutional regime is designed and other issues
concerned, the Ethiopian competition law, i.e. the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection
Proclamation currently in force established the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection Authority as federal government organ having its own legal personality and with
accountability to the Ministry of Trade (MoT).!9 The proclamation also entitles consolidated
16. Michael J. Trebilcock and Edward M. Iacobucci, 2010, Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values,
Structure, and, Mandate, Loyola University Chicago Law Review, vol.41 , issue 3, Article 5. P.457. available at,
http://search.myway.com/ search IGGmain.jhtml?searchfor= designing+competition+ law+institutions%3A +
values%2C+structure+and+mandate+pdf, (accessed date, Mar.6/2015)
17 . Supra note 16.
18. Supra note 4, Art.27 (1) and (2)
19. Ibid
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power to the Authority. Accordingly, the proclamation entitles the powers of investigation,
prosecution and adjudication under the mandates of the Authority, however, it does not defme
the accountability and independence of the organs including to the Appellate Tribunal. Also the
budgetary independence is not entitled for all organs under the Authority.
On the issue concerned to what body adjudicates contested competition cases, the proclamation
tries to apportion the adjudicative organs in to two. These include, the Adjudicative Benches of
the Authority and the Federal Appellate Tribunal. Structurally it obvious that the Adjudicative
Benches of the Authority are under the direct and mandate of the Authority but the Appellate
Tribunal concerned, it is open for a controversy. The Proclamation, however, established the
Appellate Tribunal it does not clearly define the de-jure and de-facto independence and
accountability ofthe Tribunal. Therefore, one may in the way that the Federal Appellate Tribunal
is structural under the mandate of the Authority.
Ideally, one should consider not only the level of formal independence of a CA, i.e. as
guaranteed by the legal framework, but also the level of effective independence, which depends
on its actual ability to avoid interference and capture from the government and itself. The
stronger the separation between investigator, prosecutor and adjudicator the more balanced the
decision is likely to be.2o In the same token, the stronger the independence of tribunal judges the
more impartial decision of competition cases. But this is not evident under the current trade
competition and consumer protection law. It consolidates the power on the competition authority
and the existence of more balanced decisions fall under question. Therefore, this study strives to
evaluate the issue related with consolidation of those powers of investigation, prosecution and
adjudication under the CA of Ethiopia. In this context issues like independence and
accountability ofthe CA and various organs under the Authority, internal and external check and
balance between the investigative, prosecution and adjudicative organs of the Authority,
procedural fairness in light of consolidation of power, rule of law are the issues evaluated
through the paper. Moreover, it tries to know the manner of administration of judges because it
has paramount effect on impartiality of judges and independence of the judicial system within
the Authority.
15
20 . Supra note 12, p.17
CHAPTER TWO
The Conceptual Framework of Competition and Competition Law and Policy
2.1. Introduction
Consumers gain a lot from healthy competition in the market. This is because of two reasons:
first, competition enables the firms to operate efficiently and second, competition offers
consumers a greater choice of products at lower prices. This, in turn, leads to higher benefits to
the consumers and helps in economic growth and development. However, to ensure that
consumers enjoy maximum benefits, competition must be maintained in the market. This is
ensured through a sound competition policy, of which competition law is an integral part. Here
in comes the role of the Government: Government, in general, and the competition authority in
particular. They should keep an eye on the market behavior and use several tools to promote
competition on one hand, and check anti-competitive practices, on the other. Thus the national
interest and the consumers' interest rather than individual producer's interest are protected.
When we deal with competition policy and competition law it will seem to as that these terms are
often used synonymously but they can be distinguished. The former is broader since it describes
the way in which governments take measures to promote competitive market structure and
behavior.21 Competition policy will therefore encompass within it a system of competition law.22
But for the purpose of conceptual understanding of the competition policy and law the terms are
used interchangeably for the purpose of this paper.
2.2. Competition policy
Certainly every economy is in need of a competition policy that enables the business
environment to flourish according to fair set rules of competition. Competition policy is
generally regarded as that set of public policy tools that lay the foundations for a market
economy by allowing for the efficient allocation of resources. A competition policy is not just
21 . Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edition, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2008, p.5
22. Ibid
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trade practices law. It includes both policies that are specifically directed at promoting
competition and policies that have an indirect impact on competition." Its impact may be either
on market structure influencing the incentives for competitive conduct or have a direct impact on
market conduct"
At best competition policy can be seen as just one of set of policy tools required to create an
efficient market economy. Competition policy cannot stand alone to create an efficient market
economy but other governmental policies should conform to basic market principles. Trade
policy, industrial policy, privatization, social policy and the like are need to be conducted in a
manner compatible with the market mechanism for an economy to function as efficiently as
possible." To answer the question whether competition policy is effective in a country can also
be heavily influenced by the effectiveness of other policy areas such as trade, regulation,
privatization and so forth. Answers would thus reflect the effectiveness of a mix of policies
rather than antitrust policy narrowly conceived.
Competition policy therefore refers to government measures that directly affect the behavior of
enterprises and the structure of industry." An appropriate competition policy includes both:
a) Policies that enhance competition in local and national markets such as liberalized trade
policy , relaxed foreign investment and ownership requirements and economic de-
regulation; and
b) Competition law designed to prevent anticompetitive business practices by firms and
unnecessary government intervention in the marketplace.
2.3. The essence of competition policy and regimes
23 . Uganda Law Reform Commission, a study report on competition law (LAW COM. PUB. NO.6 of 2004),
Kampala, p.5
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
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The competition regime is well known to most people, both in terms of its aim and in terms of its
application. Competition law is intended to ensure that the marketplace is competitive and is not
distorted by anticompetitive practices, so that worthy options are made available to consumers.
A perfectly competitive market requires the existence of a large number of seller and buyers,
where each seller would have only a small share of the market. Such a market further assumes
that there are no entry or exit barriers or information asymmetries and that both the seller and the
buyer have access to the market. Sellers are price takers, not price makers, and the price of a
product equals its marginal cost while making only a normal profit. A perfectly market assumed
to bring about both allocative and productive efficiency with the effect that the overall society's
welfare is maximized." Allocative efficiency is achieved when the goods are produced in the
quantities desired by the society while productive efficiency is achieved when goods are
produced at the lowest possible cost. It is also understood that competition enhances dynamic
efficiency by inter alia facilitates innovation and technological growth." But Economists still
quarrel about the effects of the intensity of competition for innovation as well as for growth. 29
They claimed that monopolistic firms are more innovative because they face looser fmancial
restrictions and because they will be able to cash in on their innovations more sweepingly than
smaller firms with small or even negligible market shares. Thus it is argued that monopolistic
market structures would lead to higher rates of innovation (and subsequently growth) and hence
introduced a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency. The theoretical argument is still
contested and the empirical evidence highly ambiguous.r"
In fact, however, a research" does support the thesis that competition is good for development,
both stimulating new business and benefiting consumers. Dutz and Hayri (1999), after surveying
the existing empirical evidence and conducting a major cross-country study, found a strong
27. Supra note cited at 9, p.87
28 . Ibid
29. Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Competition Policy - Cross- Country Evidence Using Four New,
Indicators, University of Kassel and ICER, Torino, p.4, Available at,
http://search.myway. com Isearch/GGmain.j html ?searchfor= the+ economics +0 f+ competi tion +policy+pdf
30. Ibid
31 . A research conducted by Dutz, M.A and A Hayri (1999); Does more intensive competition lead to higher
growth? CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2249.
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correlation between long-run growth and effective enforcement of antitrust and competition
policy. A recent study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
reviewed the literature and commissioned case studies around the world. The results (Brusick et
al. 2004) broadly support the view that competition is good for development, and the authors
argue that competition policy is very much complementary to other instruments for encouraging
enterprise development."
Given that there is no consensus on the relationship between the intensity of competition and
growth, competition drives firms to become more efficient and to offer a greater choice of
products at lower prices because of the fear that only the fittest will survive in the market. This
ensures best possible utilization of available resources.Y In the short term, consumers are
allowed to choose from an array of options that would have been produced absent a competition
violation; in the long term, it ensures the free market will be able to innovate. Competition law
ensures, inter alia, that the economy responds to consumer demand rather than to government
directions or individual business preferences. 34
2.4. Objectives of Competition law and policy
The objective of competition laws is maintaining and enhancing market competition by
addressing "restrictive business practices and regulate structures that significantly lessen
competition'V'' It is indeed well settled that the core purpose and emphasis of competition law is
the maintenance of competition by guarding of markets from the practices of firms that impede
competition. According to the background document on the World Bank- OECD Model Law,
''the most common of the objectives cited is the maintenance of the competitive process or of
32 . Supra note 29.
33 . Monographs on Investment and Competition Policy, Competition Policy & Law Made Easy, vol.8, 2011,
Jaipur Printers P. Ltd, p.6
34. Irina Haracoglou, 2007, Competition Law, Consumer Policy and the Retail Sector: the systems'
relation and the effects of a strengthened consumer protection policy on competition law, The
Competition Law Review, Vol.3, Issue 2, p.178, available at,
http://search.myway.comlsearch/GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=the+competition+policy+and+regimes+of+US
+pdf
35 • Supra note cited at 9.
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free competition, or the protection or promotion of effective competitionv" This is what
invariably is found in any standard competition law. For instance, a survey involving 23
countries has found that ''the enhancement of competition", "elimination/prevention of restrictive
business practices" and "economic efficiency" are the most cited objectives of competition
laws.37
Nonetheless, apart from consideration of economic efficiency, governments do have other socio-
economic and even political objectives, and priorities they wish to promote through competition
law such as consumer welfare and development. It is not indeed uncommon to come across such
objectives as ensuring employment, protecting small businesses and promoting export." This
implies the Competition Act's policy purposes begin with economic efficiency, but they extend
much further.
It is possible for systems of competition law to pursue objectives other than the economic once
of welfare and efficiency." Whether they should and, if so, what other objectives should be
pursued is extremely controversial. 40 In the Republic South African Competition Act of
No.89/1998, for instance, it is clearly stated that aside from promoting the efficiency adaptability
of the economy, the promotion a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons, is also another objective having the same
rank as that of promotion of efficiency." The efficiency objective of competition law may
promote other objectives as well. For example, promoting efficiency ofthe economy would also
promote consumer welfare." Moreover, under the Ethiopian competition Proclamation also
protecting and ensuring consumers' interest and acceleration of economic development are other
objectives of the competition law and policy other than promoting welfare and efficiency in the
market, in fact, these leads to economic development.
36. Supra note cited at 9.
37 • Ibid
38 . Ibid
39. Supra note cited at 21.
40. Ibid
41 . Art.2 of the Competition Act of the Republic of South Africa cited infra note 75.
42 • Supra note cited at 9.
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Generally, often other than the assumed purpose of safeguarding and promoting competition for
the stated objective of economic efficiency, competition laws contain other purposes, such as
furthering technological progress, improving international competitiveness, securing the survival
of small and medium enterprises, and regional development concerns.
2.5. The Historical Background of the Ethiopian Competition Policy and Regimes
Ethiopia as a long polity practiced different type of economic transformation, which has been
characterized, by its unique kind of traditional agrarian econorny.Y Within this dominant type of
economy the principal economic actors and the form of ownership ofthe economic resources has
been changing depending on the economic policy orientation of the previous and current
governments." Due to various economic ideology that followed by different governing regimes
of the country, there is no consolidated law and policy of competition in the country since the
coming to power of the EPRDF.
2.5.1. Pre-1974
The imperial regime claimed to have a free market economic policy orientation. However, it
failed to have a consolidated type of competition law. Of course, this government has been
merited for its introduction of modern legal system in the country including the codification and
promulgation of the commercial code, which primarily regulates the types, formation, and
dissolution of commercial partnerships trademark and trade name registration and the legal
protection that should be given for such commercial rights."
2.5.2. Post-1974
Ethiopian economy since 1974 till 1991 operated under centrally planned economy and hence
there were no conditions for competition policy application. Hence, the country's' economic
43 . Abebe Asamere et al, Competition scenario In Ethiopia, 2006, compiled by Aha Ethiopian Consumer
Protection Association, p.23, available at,
http://search.myway. coml search IGGmain. jhtml?searchfor= his torical + background + oHcompetition +policy
+and+reg,ime+in+Ethiopia+pdf, (accessed date, Mar. 6/2015).
44. Ibid
45. Ibid
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history on the other hand was characterized by its socialist form of economic system in which
competition in the market can't be envisaged as a matter of ideological principle. The main
economic actor in the economic system was the government." The economy was highly
centralized and there was neither real nor nominal kind of economic competition in the market.
In terms of ideology and general policy, the "Derg" opted for a socialist economic system where
market forces were deliberately repressed and socialization of the production and distribution
process pursued vigorously. By all measures it adopted a "hard control" regime between 1974/75
and 1989/90.47 In this period let alone having a competition law as such, even the existing
commercial law was in practice for quite rare incidences. This period at last came to an end in
1991 in which Ethiopia experienced another historic breakthrough both in its type of political
system and economic policy orientation."
2.5.3. Post-1991
After the downfall of the "Derg" regime, the transitional government of Ethiopia and the
subsequent, successions officially proclaimed that the economic policy of the country is a free
market economy. Adherence to a belief in the market economy leads to a great importance being
attached to competition policy and the introduction of competition laws.
Since 1992, the Government has successfully implemented a series of reform programs that have
substantial implications for market competition. These include the following short-term
economic stabilization and structural adjustment measuresr'"
• Deregulation of domestic prices, liberalization of foreign trade, privatization of public
enterprises, and abolition of all export taxes and subsidies;
• Devaluation of the exchange rate followed by the introduction of inter-bank foreign
currency market and the determination of exchange rates based on market forces;
46. Supra note cited at 43.
47. Alernayehu Geda , The Political Economy of Growth in Ethiopia, Vo1.2, p.3, Available at,
http://search.myway. coml searchl GGmain.jhtml?searchfoc historical + background + of+compeci cion+policy
+and+regjrne+in+Ethiopia+pdf, (accessed date, Mar.21/2015)
48 . Supra note cited at 43.
49 . Supra note cited at 12.
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• Enhancing private sector development and private-public partnership through providing
effective industry association, and creating a forum for consultation between the private
sector and the government;
• Promulgation of a liberal investment law for the promotion and encouragement of
private investment, both foreign and domestic, and issuance of a new labor law; and
• Strengthening and enhancing institutional support for the export sector through
strengthening/revitalizing existing institutions and establishing such new institutions as
the Ethiopian Livestock Marketing Authority; the Ethiopian Leather and Leather
Products Technology Institute, and the Ethiopian Export Promotion Agency.
The Industrial Development Strategy, which has been in effect since 2002, explicitly refers to the
private sector as the engine of growth and industrial development and stresses export-led
industrialization and competitiveness.i'' The strategy underlines the significance of market
competition to realize effective resource allocation in the country and the importance of
competitiveness to the integration of the economy into the international economic system.
Though this has been the policy direction, competition law as a consolidated form of law is not
yet in place except the coming into force of Trade Practice Proclamation of2003. In this period
trade practice proclamation No. 329/2003 was legislated with a purpose of regulating trade
practices.i J
As of the coming into force of this proclamation, 35 cases were registered for investigation in the
trade practice investigation commission office out of which 13 cases got decision. Four cases not
fall under the jurisdiction of proclamation 329/2003, whereas two cases pended additional
information. The rest ofthe cases found to be under investigation for hearing. 52
50. Supra note cited at 12.
51 . Supra note cited at 43.
52. Ibid
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The gap of the trade practice proclamation is, it does not address all the issues, which should
actually to be addressed in the competition law.53 As the proclamation does not incorporate all
competition related issues, it is not possible to discuss in detail issues of approaches to horizontal
restraints, vertical restraints, dominant market position, mergers and acquisitions cross border
abuses, check s and balances and other further details.
The succeeding proclamation next to the Trade practice proclamation of the 2003 is the Trade
practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.286/2010. This proclamation too hosts gaps,
for instance, the proclamation does not specifically mention 'economic efficiency' or market
competition as an objective either in the preamble or under art.3 which defines its objectives.
While lack of specific mention to market competition makes the proclamation different from
many other laws in the area. Moreover, the single tiered appeal system is also another reason for
the amendment of the law. However, the competition law of the country is not stable, currently
the new law Trade competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 is enacted
and governing competition cases.
2.6. Objectives of Competition Law and Policy under the Ethiopian
Competition Regime
Given that there is no stability on the competition regime of the country, all competition law
enactments beginning from the Trade Practice Proclamation of 2003 till the current Trade
competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation of 2013, states the objectives of the law in
different format and style.
Under the first specific law that had the purpose of safeguarding and promoting competition, the
Trade Practice Proclamation No.329/2003 contained its stated objectives. Accordingly, its major
objectives was to secure a faire competitive process through the prevention and elimination of
anti-competitive and unfair trade practices, and safeguarding the interests of consumers, through
53 • Supra note cited at 43.
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the prevention and elimination of any restraints on the efficient supply and distribution of goods
and services. 54
The main concern of promoting economic efficiency was not indicated under the stated
objectives of the proclamation. But under the preamble part of the proclamation it is indicated
that the policy background for the enactment of the law is a desire to establish a system that is
conducive for the promotion of competitive environment, by regulating anti-competitive
practices in order to maximize economic efficiency and social welfare.
After the repeal of the Trade Practice Proclamation, the succeeding proclamation is the Trade
Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.685/20 1O. The rational of the proclamation
as stated in the preamble are to ensure that the market practices are undertaken in a manner
consistent with a free market economic policy of the country; to protect the business community
from anti-competitive and unfair market practices; consumers from misleading market conducts;
to establish a system that is conducive for the promotion of competitive market; and to prevent
the proliferation of goods and services that endangers the health and well being of consumers.f
The proclamation also devoted an article defming its objectives. The indicated objectives of the
proclamation are promoting consumers rights and benefits; ensuring the suitableness of the
supply of goods and services to human health and safety and installing a system of follow up;
ensuring that manufacturers, importers, service dispensers and persons engaged in commercial
activities in general carryon their activities in a responsible way; and preventing and eliminating
trade practices that damage the interests and good will of businessperson. 56
It is interesting to note that the proclamation does not specifically mention 'economic efficiency'
or market competition as an objective or under the preamble save as the various world countries
concern of competition law is promoting economic efficiency. Indeed, the main preoccupation of
the proclamation seems to be more to promoting other objectives such as consumer protection
54 . See Proclamation No.329/2003, The Federal Negarit Gazeta of The Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, 9th Year No.49, Addis Ababa, 17 April, 2003, Art.3 (repealed)
55. See the Preamble of Proclamation No.685/2010, The Federal Negarit Gazeta of The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 16th Year No.49, Addis Ababa, 16 August, 2010, (repealed)
56. Supra note 55, Art.3
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and ensuring the suitability of the supply of goods and services to human health and safety rather
than to promoting economic efficiency. 57
Currently, the governing competition law of the country is the Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection Proclamation No.813/2013. Unlike its predecessor, it includes the notion of economic
efficiency by its stated objectives. The indicated objective of the proclamation are protecting the
business community from anti-competitive and unfair market practices, and also consumers from
misleading market conducts, and to establish a system that is conducive for the promotion of
competitive free market; ensuring the consumers get goods and services safe and suitable to their
health and equivalent to the price they pay; and lastly accelerating economic development. 58
Therefore, the current Ethiopian competition proclamation concerned, at least it tried to mention
the economic efficiency or market competition as an objective of the law. This fact makes it a
competition law in line with most of the world countries competition law mentioning economic
efficiency or market competition as the primary objectives.
But when the laws of other jurisdictions are assessed there are other objectives of competition
law and policy. Accordingly, competition laws contain other purposes, such as furthering
technological progress, improving international competitiveness, securing the survival of small
and medium enterprises, and regional development concerns as it is discussed above on section
2.4.59 In this regard the Ethiopian competition law and policy tried to include "consumer
protection" as an additional objective other than the main objectives stated on the preamble or
the provision stating the objectives of economic efficiency or market competition. Lack of
adequate, comprehensive consumer protection is a detriment to the achievement of healthy,
competitive markets, as well as of healthy consumers. If explicit consumer protection provisions
are included in the competition regime, there is potential for realizing greater national public
goods. This additional objective of the competition law is included since the enactment of the
repealed proclamation of the 2010 Trade Practice and Consumer Protection.
57 . Supra note cited at 9.
58 . Supra note 4, Art.3
59 . Supra note 29.
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CHAPTER THREE
Comparative Analysis of the Institutional Framework and Legal Regimes of
the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority
3.1. Introduction
Almost all countries with advanced market economies have competition laws, and most
transition and developing countries have such a law or are in the process of creating one.60 A
competition law is an overarching set of rules that touches in some way almost all sectors in a
market economy. National legal systems vary among countries and so do mechanisms for
enforcing competition laws. Judges who hear and decide competition cases may be generalists or
specialists; they may be members of the national court system or of a specialized competition
tribunal." Countries also may vary in their format or design of competition enforcing
institutions. Accordingly, countries may chose the integrated model of competition Authority- an
agency integrating both taskforces of anti-competitive and consumer protection issues; or
separate mode of institutional design- an independent competition Authority and independent
judicial system for the adjudication of competition cases. Therefore, institutional design for the
enforcement of competition and consumer protection plays a greater role in the efficiency,
fairness and independence ofthe competition regime.
One of the fundamental issues to consider in designing the institutional structure ofa competition
authority is the scope of its mandate, specifically, whether it will be confined to "core"
competition/antitrust issues, such as regulating mergers and preventing cartels and abuses of
dominance, or whether the authority will have broader responsibilities that extend, for example,
to consumer protection and sector-specific matters.f
60 . OECD Policy Rountables, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law, 2009. P.166
61. Ibid
62 • Biac, A Note: Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities, submitted
for Item VIII of the 122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 17-18 December 2014, p.2,
Available at,
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3.2. Institutional Framework of Competition
Commission/ Agencies/Authorities
There is a wide variety of institutional frameworks in which competition authorities operate.
Apparently, the institutional framework is mainly relevant for competition law enforcement and
much less so for competition advocacy. Still a brief discussion of the basic models seems to be in
order. As it is indicated under chapter one of the proposal of this paper currently the global trend
of institutional design of competition commission/agencies or authorities (for the purpose of this
study hereinafter Authority) identified in to three Models. These include; the bifurcated judicial
model; the bifurcated agency/tribunal model; and the integrated agency model. These models are
the popular and applied in various world countries and jurisdictions in pure or mixed format.
This implies, if a country has a competition regime, then the design or framework of the
institution would not be out of these three models or mix of them. The distinguishing natures of
these models discussed below.
3.2.1. The Bifurcated Judicial Model
A competition regime tailored on the format of this model obliges the competition authority to
go to regular courts for the enforcement of competition cases. Studies reveal that, where courts
are strong, independent, honest, and efficient (as in the US), the bifurcated judicial model has
some significant advantages. In this context, the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer
Authority seem to follow this model in the enforcement of consumer right protections. The
Authority's prosecution institutes an action to the regular court of respective jurisdictions.
With respect to accountability, the bifurcated judicial model entails significant accountability
through the process of judicial appeal. The model scores poorly with expertise in the
performance of the adjudicative function, but conversely, does reasonably well with respect to
detachment. Again, the bifurcated judicial model scores well with respect to transparency and
probably strikes a reasonable balance with respect to confidentiality.f
http://search. myway.comlsearch/GGmain. jhtml?searchfor=integrated+model+of+competition+ Authority
+in+ lighHof+faimess+pdf (accessed on, April, 20/2015)
63 . Supra note cited at 16, P.460-462.
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3.2.2. The Bifurcated Agency/Tribunal Model
The bifurcated agency/tribunal model is an institutional model that competition authorities are
required to go to a specialized competition tribunal for the enforcement of competition cases.
Due to various reasons courts in developing countries are weak, therefore, the bifurcated
agency/tribunal models have some significant advantage according to some studies." For
instance, jurisdictions adopting bifurcated agency/tribunal models, the South African, Chilean,
and Canadian experiences reveal the importance of ensuring that the members ofthe adjudicative
tribunal have substantial legal and economic expertise of a consistent and continuous nature. 65
On its face, this model seems designed to achieve a reasonable balance amongst the various
values66. The model ensures a high level of independence in the performance of the adjudicative
function, while ensuring some degree of accountability in the performance of this function
through the judicial appeal process. Moreover, this model may also be designed to provide a
reasonable balance between administrative efficiency and due process values in that all
proceedings shall be dealt with as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and
considerations of fairness permit. 67
64 . Eleanor M. Fox and Michael J. Trebilcock, The Design of Competition Law Institutions and the Global
Convergence of Process Norms: The GAL Competition Project, 2012, New York University Law and
Economics Working paper 304, p.8, Available at,
http://search.myway. coml search IGGmain.jhtrnl?searchfor= integra ted+model +of+ competition +Authority
+in+light+ofHaimess+pdf (accessed date, April, 20/2015)
65 . Ibid, p.9
66 . The normative criteria or values for evaluating competition law institutions are likely to be inherently
uncontroversial. (Michael J. Trebilcock and Edward M. Iacobucci, 2010) argue that any competition-policy
institutional regime must address five fundamental questions. First, who investigates and initiates proceedings
(including the relative roles of public and private enforcement)? Second, to the extent that investigation and
other enforcement activities are undertaken by the government, which branch of the government is
responsible? For example, the questions of who hires competition policy bureaucrats, to whom are they
accountable, and whether the competition-enforcement body is part of a line ministry or is an independent
agency with its own budget and personnel policies must be addressed. Third, what body adjudicates contested
competition proceedings? Does a branch of the enforcement agency adjudicate, or is there a completely
independent body? What process does the adjudicative body follow? Fourth, to what extent is there judicial
review of competition decisions? Finally, what role, if any, is there for political review by elected officials of
competition agency decisions? See also note cited at Michael J.Trebilcock.
67. Supra note cited at 16, p.461-462
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3.2.3. The Integrated Agency Model
The integrated agency/authority model is also the other type of institutional design of
competition regime. Under this type of model, a single specialized agency undertakes
investigative, enforcement and adjudicative functions. The integrated agency model represents
an agency with a double mission: responsibilities for the enforcement of both competition law
and consumer protection law.68 For instance, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC), the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the EU, Japan, China, and US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) are representatives for the integrated agency model. 69 In this regard, due to
inclusion of consumer protection objective and its double mission or objective, the Ethiopian
Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (ETCCP A) on its institutional framework
seem to be grouped under the integrated agency/authority model.
Generally, whichever model is chosen either bifurcated judicial, bifurcated agency or integrated
models, cases go to court, whether immediately or ultimately. The studies reveal numerous
problems with court systems including unacceptable delays and unknowledgeable jurists. In
some jurisdictions, review of agency or tribunal determinations is de novo (South Africa) and in
others review is deferential to fact-finding, at least normally and to some extent (European
Union; US-appeals from the FTC). Concerns have arisen in both directions that is too much
intrusion by appellate courts (like South Africa) and too little examination by appellate courts
(like the case of European Union) thus underlining the observation that there are costs, benefits,
and trade-offs of both approaches, and feasible solutions are particular to the context."
3.3. Institutional Framework (Design) of Competition Authorities under the
Experiences of Some Jurisdictions
68 . Eleanor M. Fox and Michael J. Trebilcock, The Design of Competition Law Institutions and the Global
Convergence of Process Norms: The GAL Competition Project, 2012, New York University Law and
Economics Working paper 304, p.8, Available at,
htt;p:llsearch.myway.com/search/GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=integrated+model+of+competition+Authority
+in+light+ofHaimess+pdf (accessed date, April, 20/2015)
69. Ibid
70 . Supra note 68.
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Institutional framework (design) concerned, it does not simply about institutional set up or
institutional organization but also includes many other factors. Is competition law located in a
common law or civil law system? Is enforcement civil only or also criminal? Is there one federal
enforcement body or more (as in China and the United States)? Is there a right of private
enforcement, and how does private enforcement interact with public enforcement? The elements
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with virtually all jurisdictions aspiring to efficient and
effective enforcement subject to effective protection of rights, and subject to the context of the
jurisdiction." Here in under experiences of some jurisdictions regarding to institutional
framework are discussed.
3.3.1. France
In France March 2nd, 2009 marked the advent of the Competition Authority, which was created
by way of transformation of the previous Competition Council. 72 The Authority takes over the
current organization of the Council while incorporating the teams formerly in charge of carrying
out dawn raids within the Ministry of Economy. Thus, France now enjoys a single independent
competition agency.
3.3.1.1. Organizational Structure and Functions of the Competition Authority
Antitrust cases are launched and prosecuted by the Investigation Services acting under the
direction of the General Rapporteur with no involvement of the College whatsoever. The
College then adjudicates all aspects of the case, with no involvement at all by the Investigation
Services in the decision-making process. This separation of functions has proved extremely
beneficial because it guarantees an intense debate both with the parties and within the
organization that ultimately leads to rich, strong, and fair decisions. Accordingly, due process
and rights of defense remain guaranteed by a fully fledged system of internal checks and
balances.
71 . Supra note 68.
72 • Bruno Lasserre, Trustbusters: Competition Policy Authorities Speak Out, D. S. Evans and F. Jenny
Eds., Competition Policy International, 2009, p.2
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Given the internal separation between the investigative body and the adjudicative body, the
Hearing Officer (which is a first among European NCAs) has not been given a decision-making
power on procedural issues. The Hearing Officer is therefore a procedural expert who can follow
the investigative process and help resolve issues as they arise before providing feedback to the
College.
Generally, the Authority is now solely responsible for making competition work on the markets
by overseeing mergers as well as by enforcing rules prohibiting cartels, anticompetitive
agreements, and abuses of dominance.
3.3.2. Republic of South Africa
3.3.2.1. Organizational Structure of the Competition Regulatory Authorities
South Africa has a common law legal system." Its current competition regime is just over
decade old and is based on the Competition Act 1998. The Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998,
accordingly, establishes three independent competition regulatory authorities. These are the
Commission, the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), and the Competition Appeal Court
(formerly, the Competition Board). These institutions are established as an independent
regulatory authority with respect to the taskforce they are authorized by the Competition Act.
Accordingly, the Commission is the investigative and enforcement agency, the Tribunal is the
adjudicative body and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) considers appeals against decisions
of the Tribunal. The Competition authorities are functionally independent institutions, but are
administratively accountable to the Economic Development Department."
3.3.2.2. Power and Functions of the Institutions
3.3.2.2.1. The Competition Commission
The Competition Commission is empowered by the Competition Act to investigate, control and
evaluate restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant positions and mergers in order to
73 . Supra note cited at 68.
74. Annual Report 2013/2014 of The Competition Commission of Republic of South Africa, p.4, Available
at,
http://search.myway.com/ search! GGmain.jhtrnl?searchfor=the+ lagal+Act+of+the+ South+ African+comp
etition+Act+of+the+2013+pdf, (accessed date, April, 21/2015)
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achieve equity and efficiency in the South African economy. The Commission is independent
and subject only to the Constitution and the law; and must be impartial and must perform its
functions without fear, favor, or prejudice.75
3.3.2.2.2. The Competition Tribunal
The Competition Tribunal is a juristic person. It may adjudicate on any conduct prohibited in
terms of Anti-competitive practices, to determine whether prohibited conduct has occurred, and,
if so, to impose any remedy provided for in the Act; adjudicate on any other matter that may, in
terms of the Act, be considered by it, and make any order provided for in the Act; hear appeals
from, or review any decision of, the Competition Commission that may in terms of the Act be
referred to it; and make any ruling or order necessary or incidental to the performance of its
functions in terms of the Competition Act.76 Each member of the Competition Tribunal must
have suitable qualifications and experience in economics, law, commerce, industry or public
affairs."
3.3.2.2.3. The Competition Appeal Court (CAC)
This institution is established as a court to be known as the Competition Appeal Court, which- is
a court contemplated as per section 166( e) of the Constitution of RSA with a status similar to
that of a High Court. This implies for all judicial matters regarding competition cases the CAC
has the status a High Court. The Competition Appeal Court may review any decision of the
Competition Tribunal, consider an appeal arising from the Competition Tribunal, confirm,
amend or set aside a decision or order of the Competition Tribunal, or remit a matter to the
Competition Tribunal for a further hearing on any appropriate terms. 78
75 . See the Republic of South African, Competition Act, Competition Act, Act No. 89 of 1998, Government
Gazette, Vol. 400, Cape Town, 30 October 1998, Art.20. Available at,
http://search.myway. coml searchl GGmain.j html?searchfor= the+ independence +0 f+ tribunal +judges + of+ co
mpetition+authority+of+republic+of+south+Africa+pdf, (accessed at, March, 5, 2015)
76. Ibid, Arts.26(1)b and 27
77 . Ibid, Art.28(2)b
78. Supra note 75, Art.37
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3.3.3. Australia
3.3.3.1. Organizational Structure
As per the Australian Constitution the executive or administration cannot exercise judicial
power. In the federal system, judicial power can only be exercised by the courtS.79 Courts are
required to be comprised of independent judicial officers with security of tenure and to have the
power to make and enforce orders.
Organizationally, the Australian Competition Code establishes three independent enforcement
organs. These are discussed below.
3.3.3.1.1. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
The primary enforcement agency for competition law in Australia is the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The agency is structurally independent of government and,
although it reports to the government and is subject to government oversight, it carries out its
statutory functions free from government influence.8o
Australian models have elements of the bifurcated agency models. The agency is responsible for
investigating breaches of competition law; taking enforcement proceedings to the courts of
general jurisdiction (the Federal Court in Australia); and undertaking first instance adjudications
in merger control proceedings and in a variety of regulatory matters (for example in the
telecommunications and energy sectors).81
3.3.3.1.2. The Australian Competition Tribunal
79 . OECD Policy Roundtables, Procedural Fairness: Competition Authorities, Courts and Recent
Developments, 2012, p.23. Available at,
http://search.myway.com/ searchl GGmain.jhtml ?searchfor= the+independence+ oH tribunal +judges +oH co
mpetition+authority+oHIndia+pdf ,(accessed at, March 21, 2015)
80 . Supra note cited at 68.
81 . Ibid
34
The Australian Competition Tribunal is a review body. It is a specialist tribunal that sits in
divisions comprising one federal court judge and two lay members. 82A review by the Tribunal is
a re-hearing or a re-consideration of a matter. The Tribunal may perform all the functions and
exercise all the powers of the original decision-maker for the purposes of review. It can affirm,
set aside or vary the original decision. A presidential member must be a judge of the Federal
Court of Australia. Other members must have knowledge of or experience in industry,
commerce, economics, law or public administration.V The Tribunal has no resources of its own.
The funds appropriated by Parliament for the purposes of the Tribunal are managed by the
Federal Court."
3.3.3.1.3. The Federal Court
In Australia, as a consequence of the constitutional separation of judicial and administrative
powers, only a court can determine whether a contravention of the Trade Practices Act has
occurred and make orders against offenders." The relevant court is the Federal Court of
Australia (although State and Territory Supreme Courts can hear cases under the Competition
Code). Decisions of the Federal Court can be appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court,
and then to the High Court of Australia. 86
3.3.4. India
3.3.4.1. Organizational structure and Functions of Competition Organs
The Indian Competition Amendment Act of 2007 separated the Commission into two
independent bodies. These are the Competition Commission of India (Commission), an expert
administrative body, and the Competition Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal), an adjudicatory
appellate body.87
82 . Supra note 68.
83. OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, Competition Policy in Australia, 2010, p.33, Available at,
http://search.myway.com/search/ GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=competition +policy+and +regimes+of+ France
+pdf, (accessed at, April, 16, 2015).
84 . Ibid, p.34
85 . Supra note cited at 83.
86. Ibid
87 . Supra note cited at 68.
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3.3.4.1.1. The Competition Commission
The Commission may commence inquiries either on its own motion or on receipt of a complaint
from any person, consumer, or their association or trade association or on reference from the
central government or the state government or any other statutory body. The Commission is
further assisted by the Director General of Investigation. The Office of the Director General is
the investigative arm of the Commission. The Commission must refer all matters for
investigation to the Director General. 88The Commission is not bound by the findings made by
the Director General. The Commission may choose either to accept or reject the investigation
report or issue fresh instructions to the Director General for carrying out further investigations.
As per the Competition Act of India, all cases relating to anti-competitive practices can only be
investigated by the Competition Commission ofIndia (CCI).89
3.3.4.1.2. The Competition Appellate Tribunal
The Tribunal discharges the appellate function. Any party aggrieved by an order of the
Commission may appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after giving the parties an opportunity to
of be heard, may modify or set aside the order of the Commission. Parties aggrieved by the
Tribunal's order may make a final appeal to the Supreme Court ofIndia. The Tribunal consists
of a chairperson and two other members. Tribunal members are requ ired to have knowledge and
experience of not less than twenty-five years in competition matters including areas such as
economics, business, commerce, international trade.
The structure of the Indian competition law system is a mix ofa bifurcated agency model and the
integrated agency model. The Commission is vested with inquisitorial, investigative, regulatory,
adjudicatory, and, to a limited extent, advisory jurisdiction. The Tribunal has appellate
jurisdiction over the orders passed by the Commission.
88 . Supra note cited at 68.
89 . Nishith Desai, Competition Law In India: Jurisprudential Trends and the Way Forward, 2013, p.17
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3.4. Institutional Framework and Legal Regimes of the Ethiopian Trade
Competition and Consumer Protection Law
3.4.1. Institutional Framework
One of the fundamental issues to consider in designing the institutional structure ofa competition
authority is the scope of its mandate, specifically, whether it will be confmed to "core"
competition/antitrust issues, such as regulating mergers and preventing cartels and abuses of
dominance, or whether the authority will have broader responsibilities that extend, for example,
to consumer protection and sector-specific matters."
In the current environment of increased budgetary scrutiny, cost reduction is often cited as a key
factor in combining multiple functions into a single agency." Such combinations can bring
administrative efficiencies as resources are shared and duplicative efforts are minimized. 92
Currently, a number of jurisdictions, for instance, Australia, UK and the like have undertaken
institutional reorganization to the integrated type of agency system. Even if Ethiopia previously
does not have a separated institution of consumer protection authority or agency, the enactment
of the 2010 Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation introduced the integrated
mode of agency model and the current proclamation also followed the path of the repealed
proclamation of 2010 regarding to integration of the competition law with consumer protection
regimes. It is evident that the first regime of competition law, i.e. the Trade Practice
Proclamation does not include the consumer issues in organized fashion.
In addition to improving efficiency, creating a multifunctional competition authority can also
enhance the entity's overall effectiveness. Integrating multiple functions within a single authority
can generate synergies as experts from related fields are brought together to analyze problems
collectively." In this regard, the current competition proclamation established a single Authority
with a multiple functions in enforcing competition and consumer oriented cases.
90 . Supra note cited at 62, p.2.
91. Ibid
92. Ibid
93. Ibid
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3.4.2. Enforcing Organ of Trade Competition and Consumer Protection law in Ethiopia
3.4.2.1. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority
The Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013
(hereinafter the competition Proclamation) under part IV, establishes the Trade Competition and
Consumer Protection Authority (hereinafter the Competition Authority) for the enforcement of
competition law. The Competition Authority is the primary agency for the enforcement of
competition law in Ethiopia with an autonomous federal government body having its own legal
personality." The competition authority shall be accountable to the Ministry of Trade (MoT) and
shall be governed by the provisions ofthe competition proclamation. 95
The Proclamation under its preamble as an objective stated that to ensure the implementation of
the system of trade competition and consumer protection it has to be found necessary to
determine the powers and duties of the concerned organs particularly, the organs in charge of
investigation, prosecution and judicial responsibility."
3.4.4. Organizational Structure of the Competition Authority
The Competition Proclamation of 2013 establishes three organs under the Authority. These are
the Competition organ for conducting investigation, institution of action (prosecution) and an
organ with adjudication power. At the federal level the judicial organ within the competition
authority further divided in to two. These are the adjudicative bench ofthe competition authority
and the federal appellate tribunal. Though the law ambitiously provides for the establishment of
the adjudicative tribunals under the authority, it does not specify whether they are institutionally
independent or not.
Personnel organization concerned the Authority shall have a Director General and, as may be
necessary, Deputy Director Generals to be appointed by the Prime Minister up on the
recommendation of the Minister of Trade. The appointment of judges, assignment of
94. Supra note 4, Art.27.
95 . Ibid, Art.27 (2) & (3)
96 . Ibid, See the preamble of the proclamation cited at 4.
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investigative officers and prosecutors are made in accordance with the proclamation. The
Authority also has the necessary staff 97
3.4.5. Power and Functions of the Authority
The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority is entrusted with various functions,
among others investigative, enforcement and judicial powers. Among others the authority is
empowered to take appropriate measures to increase market transparency; take appropriate
measures to develop public awareness on the provision of the competition proclamation; receive
and decide on, merger notifications; and protect consumers from unfair practices of business
persons." It also organize judicial organs with jurisdiction on issues of trade competition and
consumer protection; provide support to industrial self-regulation in order to enable various
industrial sectors regulate anti-competitive and unfair trade practices; own property, enter into
contracts, sue and be sued in its own name; and perform such other related activities conducive
for the attainment of its objectives."
3.4.5.1. Conducting Investigation
Under the Ethiopian competition proclamation the investigative functions are not structurally
independent from other organs of the Authority- the prosecution and adjudicative. Investigation
of competition issues concerned the Authority has a wide range of roles and responsibilities.
Accordingly, the Authority shall conduct investigation where there is sufficient ground to
suspect, based on its own information or information given to it by any person, that an offence
has been committed anywhere, entailing administrative measures and administrative penalty
pursuant to Article 32 and 42 or criminal penalty pursuant to sub-article (1) or (7) of Article 43
of the competition prcclamation.l'" Entailing criminal penalty that has been committed in Addis
Ababa or Dire Dawa city administrations; the authority shall conduct investigation pursuant to
sub-articles 2-6 of Article 43 ofthe proclamation. 101
97 . Supra note cited at 4, Art.28
98 . Supra note 4, Art.30.
99. Ibid
100 . Id, Art. 36 (1)
101 • Id, Art.36(1)b
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The Authority has a power to order the police forces under the Federal Police Commission and
the two city administrations' police commission where it fmds necessary to conduct investigation
activities.l'" In the course of conducting investigations, the Authority is granted with a power to
search or seizure by its investigative officer as ordered by an adjudicative bench of the Authority
itself. 103 Moreover, an investigative officer of the Authority may enter into the business premises
of the suspect or any other place where goods are stored or stop a vehicle loaded with goods and
conduct search while conducting investigation.l'" Taking samples of goods necessary for the
investigation; examining and taking the copies of records and documents kept in any form; and
seizing goods illegally stored or being transported or sealing their storage or container are the
powers of the Authority while it conducts investigation.l'"
3.4.5.2. Institution of Action (Enforcement)
The Ethiopian Competition Authority other than investigating criminal violations has a power to
prosecute or enforce the competition issues. Under the Ethiopian competition law where
prosecutions are sought, the prosecutor of the Authority based on the findings of investigation
institute an action to administrative measures and penalty to be imposed by the adjudicative
benches of the Authority and criminal penalty to be imposed by the competent Federal Court.
Any other civil cases are instituted by private parties whether it be a business person who has
sustained damage arising from an act of unfair competition and claims payment compensation;
or consumer who claims payment of compensation for the damages he has suffered because of
purchase or use of the goods or services institute an action before the adjudicative bench of the
Authority.
Thus, for criminal prosecution, ETCCPA reflects a version of the bifurcated judicial model'".
But in the enforcement of private parties civil claim the Authority seems follow a version of
bifurcated agency modell07 on the fact that it is required to go to a specialized competition
102 . Ibid, Art.36(2)
103 . Ibid, Art.36(3)
104. Ibid, Art.36(4).
105 . Ibid, sub-article 1 of Art. 36 (a-d)
106. See the discussion made on bifurcated judicial model on the previous section of3.2.1.
107 . See also the discussion made on bifurcated agency model on the previous section of 3.2.2.
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tribunal, i.e. Adjudicative bench of the Authority and then Federal Appellate Tribunal, as the
case may be.
3.4.5.3. Adj udicative Benches of the Authority
The authority has also been granted extensive judicial power. It shall have judicial power to take
measures and impose fmes in accordance with Article 42 of the proclamation on a business
person; and order payment of compensation in accordance with the relevant laws to business
persons victimized by acts of unfair competition committed in violation of the provisions of part
two of the proclamation. 108 The Authority also exercises its judicial power by ordering
compensation in accordance with the relevant laws to consumers victimized by transactions
conducted in the Addis Ababa or Dire Dawa city administrations in violation of consumers'
protection provisions stipulated under part three ofthis proclamation. 109
Administrative measures concerned, the Authority has a power to take administrative measures
by ordering discontinuance of the act pronounced unfair; taking any other appropriate measure
that enables to reinstate the victims competitive position; and order suspension or revocation of
the business license of the offender pursuant to sub-article (l)(a) of Art.32.110
The adjudicative benches of the Authority in the course of conducting their judicial functions
order any person to furnish information and submit documents that may required; summon any
witness to appear and testify; execution of orders and decisions of the adjudicative benches;
order the police or any other appropriate organ; and order the attachment, seizure and sale of
goods. The adjudicative benches also consider the nature, duration, gravity and extent of the
offence; the damage suffered; the market circumstances in which commission of the offence took
place; benefit derived from the offence; the economic status of the offender and the like during
determining administrative penalty or administrative measures.
In most jurisdictions, legislators elect to police by judicial review. It is widely held that
independent judicial review of the decisions of competition authorities, whether through the
regular courts or through administrative tribunals, is desirable for the sake of the fairness and
108. Supra note 4, Art.32 (1) a & b.
109 • Ibid, sub-article 1 (c)
110 . Ibid, sub-article 2.
integrity of the decision-making process. Due to this fact jurisdictions provide a right of appeal,
which is one of the universal rights of defense. Therefore, the Ethiopian competition
proclamation is not an exception not to provide this right. Accordingly, any person aggrieved by
the decision of the Authority to prohibit merger or to revoke merger approval or to ban a
commercial advertisement or by any decision of an adjudicative bench of the Authority may
appeal to the Federal Appellate Tribunal within 30 days from the date of decision. The Federal
Appellate Tribunal upon examining an appeal submitted to it confirm, reverse or vary the
decision, or remand the case with necessary instructions to the Authority or the adjudicative
bench of the Authority. III The decision of the Federal Appellate Tribunal on the appeal
submitted to it shall be fmal, provided, however, that the party that claims the existence of
mistake on question of law regarding a decision passed may lodge appeal to the Federal Supreme
Court within 30 days from the date of the decision.
Most jurisdictions appear to favor a procedural review of competition cases whereby the
appellate body confmes itself to a consideration of the law, including a review of procedures
adopted by competition authorities in the exercise of their investigative and decision-making
functions, rather than a consideration de novo of both evidence and legal arguments, for instance,
like the case of South Africa. I 12
A right of appeal to a panel of decision-makers who can set aside decisions based on error is a
recognized right of defense. So too is this function a recognized vehicle for obtaining more
clarity and thus more predictability of the law. Scope of review of fact-finding differs, with some
courts review limited to manifest error of law and others assigned de novo review.113 One can
understand from this fact that the standard of review applied by the courts in competition cases
varies between jurisdictions, and may also depend upon the particular administrative or judicial
act ofthe country.
When we analyze the appeal system of the Ethiopian competition law, the federal supreme court
only entertain the case on error of law but not fact-finding or analyze evidence. The extent of
111 . Supra note 4, Art.33(3)
112. Supra note cited at 68.
113 . Ibid
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judicial review concerned, there are a line of arguments that when there is a lack of separation of
prosecutor and decision-maker in the competition law system, more in-depth review seems
appropriate.i'" It is argued that more intense judicial control is one of the ways to address the
emergence of independent national competition and other regulatory authorities, which often
have wide-ranging discretionary powers, in order to counterbalance the lack of political and also
administrative accountability.l "
3.4.5.4. The Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal
The Federal Appellate Tribunal is the new invention the 2013 Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection Proclamation. Under the repealed law of the Trade Practice and Consumer Protection
Proclamation of2010 this institution was not established. In this regard, the current Proclamation
in some extent solved the Problems of loose appeal system which is witnessed under the
previous competition proclamation.
Accordingly, this appellate tribunal, like other jurisdictions, for instance, the South African
Competition Appellate Court (CAC), may review any decision of the Authority (i.e. to prohibit
and revoke merger approvals and to ban commercial advertisements) and Adjudicative Benches
of the Authority, confirm, reverse or vary the decision, or' remand the case, with necessary
instructions, to the Authority or the Adjudicative benches of the Authority for a further hearing
on any appropriate terms as the case may be. 116
However, the competition appellate court of South Africa is contemplated legally as a court; it is
not clear when we come to the Ethiopian experience. Even the Appellate Tribunal's Structural
attachment to the Authority and whether or not it is structured with general courts ofthe Federal
Government is not clearly defined. Financially too the Tribunal is dependent on the Authority
but it is separately established competition judicial institution. In this regard, for instance, even if
the Australian Competition Tribunal has no resources of its own, the funds appropriated by
114 . Supra note cited at 68.
115 . Katalin J. Cseres, Accession to the EU's Competition Law Regime: A Law and Governance Approach,
2014, Year Book of Antitrust Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, P.50. Available at,
http://search.myway.com/search/GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=K.J.+Cseres + full+text+of+ the+integrated+ an
d+separated+model+of+competition+Authority, (accessed date, March, 15,2015)
116 . See Art.33(3) of the proclamation cited at note 4.
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Parliament for the purposes ofthe Tribunal are managed by the Federal Court. Here one can see
the actual independence ofthe Tribunal from the Competition Commission.
Moreover, the status ofthe Appellate Tribunal is not defmed under the law. In fact, when we see
the current professional composition of the Tribunal, there are three judges appointed by the
Prime Minister of the Country. Accordingly, these judges are previously working in State and
Federal Supreme Courts. As appeal concerned, the decision of the Tribunal is appealed to the
Federal Supreme Court, provided that the claims are arisen mistake on question of law existed.
3.4.6. The Structural Independence of the Authority
Independence from government politics is an important element of any competition agency.
Independence from government, or lack thereof, can have a considerable impact on market
stability, the facilitation of investment, and the efficient operations of competition agencies.l'"
The Trade Practice and Consumer Protection proclamation established the authority as an
autonomous federal government organ having its own legal personality.!'" Other than its
accountability to the Ministry of Trade (MoT), the Authority is an independent federal
government body. Including the tasks of investigation all other functions imposed by the
proclamation to be enforced are now the mandate of the Authority. This consolidated power of
investigation, enforcement (prosecution) and adjudication given for the single Authority is the
recent development that the repealed Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation
No.685/2010 does not recognized and it was apportioned the investigation wing to the then
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI). The current competition proclamation, in fact, boldly
states that the Authority is independent and established the Adjudicative Benches and Federal
Appellate Tribunal. The investigative, enforcement and adjudication organs of the Authority are
not structurally independent.
However, the proclamation under Art.35 states that judges appointed pursuant to the provision of
the proclamation shall be independent of any interference or instructions by any person with
regard to cases they adjudicate, surprisingly it is unclear whether or not the adjudication organ
117 . Supra note cited at 62.
118. Supra note 4, Art.27(1).
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including the Federal Appellate Tribunal is structurally independent. The judicial organs with
jurisdictions on issues of trade competition and consumer protection are organized by the
Authority. Even the Appellate Tribunal is dependent on the Authority on the provision of
secretarial and other services. Though the Authority has a budget allocated by the government
nothing is indicated about in what manner the budget is allocated to the organs of the Authority
including the judicial organs.l " The Tribunals have no budget or resource of their own. The
proclamation is also unclear regarding to this issue.
The more prevalent practice among countries is to provide for the allocation of funds to
competition authorities are made directly by the legislature. The competition authorities of
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Pakistan, the Russian Federation,
Singapore and Slovakia submit budget requests directly to the finance ministry or treasury. In
some cases, the authority may raise and retain additional funds from fees. For instance,
competition authorities in Australia, Peru, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Turkey can receive
income from filing fees in addition to budgetary allocations by their respective legislatures while
the Fair Trading Commissions of Sri Lanka and Jamaica have to do with parliamentary
allocations. 120
3.4.7. Appointment and Composition
The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation provides for the establishment of
the Authority. According to the Proclamation, the Authority would be composed of a Director
General and, as may be necessary, an unspecified number of Deputy Director Generals to be
appointed by the Prime Minster upon the recommendation of the Minister of Trade. And judges
with the necessary professional qualification, educational background and experience are
appointed by the Prime Minister. 121 Other than the members of the appointee, the Authority also
comprise investigative officers conducting investigation and prosecutor instituting an action and
119. Supra note 4, Art.44
120. Review of the Legal and Institutional Framework for Market Competition in Ethiopia, written by the
Research Team including; Fikremarkos Merso(Dr), Imiru Tamirat Yigezu, Seyoum Yohannes, Yosef
Endeshaw and Tilahun Teshome Retta(prof.). available at,
http://search.myway.com/search/ GGmain.jhtml?searchfor= LLM +thesis +0£+ the+ethiopian +competition+
law+in+addis+ababa+university+pdf&st=tab&ptb=935E4832 , (accessed day Marl 8. 2015)
121 . Supra note 4, sub-articles (1) & (2) of Art. 28
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the necessary staff 122 The Proclamation does not determine the term of office of the Director
General or Deputy Director Generals, as the case may be.
Moreover, the proclamation is unclear regarding to the administration of judges or it does not
indicate that the issue concerned will be governed by directives that may be enacted as per the
proclamation. Accordingly, the laws governing the tenure, discipline, removal and transfer of
judges is not addressed by the proclamation. Though, these issues are out of the scope of the
study, on their own may have effect on the independence and impartiality of the tribunal judges
of the Authority.
3.4.8. Power and Functions of the Director General
The proclamation makes it clear that the Director General of the Authority is the chief executive
officer of the Authority and direct and administer the activities of the Authority. Accordingly, the
Director General shall have the power and duties to ascertain the proper implementation of the
powers and duties of the Authority provided under Articles 30 and 32 of the proclamation;
employ and administer employees of the Authority based on the principles of the Federal Civil
Service law; and represent the Authority in its dealing with third parties.123 Whenever efficient
performance in the activities of the Authority is required, the Director General may delegate
parts of his powers and duties to other employee of the Authority. 124
122. Supra note 4, sub-articles (3) & (4)
123 . Ibid, Art.31 (1)&(2)
124 . Ibid, sub-article (3) of Art.31
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CHAPTER FOUR
Evaluating Issues Related With Consolidation of Investigation, Prosecution
and Adjudication Powers under the Ethiopian Competition Authority
4.1. Introduction
Independence In a democratic society means accountability. These independence and
accountability are two sides of the same coin that should go hand-in-hand. To this extent,
internal and external checks and balances need to be designed towards ensuring independence,
while making the institution responsible for its actions and decisions.
There is widespread agreement that independent regulators are at the core of regulatory
governance in liberalized economies and a globalized world economy. Indeed, the UNCTAD
Model Law on Competition is formulated on the assumption that the most efficient type of
administrative authority for competition enforcement is likely to be one that (a) is quasi-
autonomous or independent of the Government, with strong judicial and administrative powers
for conducting investigations and applying sanctions; and (b) provides the possibility of recourse
to a higher judicial body. It is generally recognized that any assessment of the independence of
competition authorities must necessarily examine both de facto independence (what exists in
reality) and de jure independence (what is reflected in the statutes) because measures of
independence vary by country. For instance, in Canada not only the competition Authority but
also organs under the competition Authority are independent as per the competition Act of the
country. The investigation and research directorate and the competition tribunals operate their
task autonomously and this ensures the independence of each organs of the Authority. 125
In the context of the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority, as it is
clearly indicated under the establishing proclamation, independence or autonomy is only given
on the Authority level, however, it is accountable to the Ministry of Trade. The Authority, as
125 . The OECD Policy Roundtables, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law, 1996, p.116. available at
http://search.myway.com/search/ GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=what+is+competition+ law%3F +pdf , (accessed
at, Mar.22, 2015)
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discussed under the previous chapter, given with various tasks, for the purpose of this paper,
other that the task of policy advocacy. These include investigation, prosecution and adjudication
powers. This implies that all procedures that are needed for the fulfillment of rule of law are
consolidated under the mandates of the Authority. This in turn pul1s out other problems like
fairness, institutional independence including the de jure and de facto, check and balance,
officers' professional independence issues. Moreover, the independence ofthe Federal Appellate
Tribunal is also the matter of controversy. The Appellate Tribunal has not defined independence
and accountability. These and the like issues are evaluated in light of the fairness and rule of law
due to the consolidated power of investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the Ethiopian
Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority.
4.2. Independence and Accountability of the Authority
There is thus a trade-off between independence and accountability, with greater discretion
counterbalanced by stricter standards of accountability. This trade-off is generally deemed
desirable because it ensures that the competition authority does not stray from the agenda set by
the legislature. Independence and accountability can also be seen as interdependent, such that
where accountability is perceived to be high, there is increased willingness to concede greater
discretion and independence. The opposite is also true in that, where accountability is perceived
to be lacking, it can be expected that there will be increased pressure on the executive and
legislature to exert control. 126
Independence and accountability concerned, the Ethiopian competition proclamation states that
the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority ('the Authority') as an autonomous
establishment to ensure the implementation of the system of trade competition and consumer
protection. However, it is independent also made accountable to the Ministry of Trade (MoT).127
But the issue that is not made clear with the law is that in what manner the accountability
workout? We have said previously that without accountability it is very hard to think
126. Note by the UNCTAD secretariat, Independence and accountability of competition authorities, Geneva,
2008, p.5. available at,
http: ; ; search.myway.com; search; GGmain.jhtml?searchfor= independence +and +accountabilit.y+of+compet
ition+authorit.y+pdf , (accessed at, Mar.22, 2015)
127 . Supra note 4, Art.27 (2)
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independence. Therefore, the toolkit of accountability should be clear. According to Ato
Tekalign Kedir, legal expert in Ministry of Trade, accountability is expressed in most of cases by
supervision, evaluation and reporting system.128 In fact, the competition proclamation does not
made things clear regarding to accountability.l'" Various directorates under the Ministry of
Trade follow similar trend that their accountability to the Ministry is experienced by being
supervised, evaluated and submitting report to the Ministry. 130 Accordingly, one can assume that
the Authority's relationship with the Ministry seems follow similar format. 131
It is thus clear that, in reality, independence is never absolute. 132 Some would argue that the word
"autonomous" is more appropriate terminology, because it reflects the trade-off between
independence and accountability.l " In this context the Ethiopian competition proclamation tried
to follow the most accepted terminology but it does not make things clear related with
accountability and this in its own has impact on independence (on its appropriate terminology
'autonomous') of the Authority.
4.3. Institutional (structural) independence
4.3.1. 'De jure' Independence
Institutional efficacy demands functional independence. Functional independence for an
institution implies achieving the desired degree of autonomy and maintaining an arm's length
relationship from various authorities and interest groups generally. De jure independence simply
implies what is stated under the laws of a country about specific institutions independence.
Accordingly, the Ethiopian competition proclamation established different institutions under the
competition Authority. These are the investigation, prosecution and adjudication organs. These
organs are directed and administered by the Authority under a wholesale format. As the name
indicates these organs are imposed with different responsibilities but are under the same roof.
Other than the Federal Appellate Tribunal the law does not give recognition about the
128. Interview with Ato Tekalign Kedir, a legal expert, in MoT, May, 7/2015, Addis Ababa.
129 . Ibid
130. Ibid
131 . Ibid
132 . Supra note cited at 126.
133 . Ibid
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independence of the organs. Even the independence of the federal appellate tribunal itself is
under controversy.
Under Art.33 (1) of the proclamation, it states that the Federal Appellate Tribunal is hereby
established. In fact, establishment of the Appellate Tribunal is an important development in the
current proclamation as compared with the previous Trade Practice and Consumer Protection
Proclamation that does not established such institution and left the regime with a single tier
appeal system. But the law failed to use a terms like 'independent' or 'autonomous'. From this
one can understand that, even legally, the independence of the appellate tribunal is not
recognized. Some argue that the proclamation clearly identified the appellate tribunal as an
independent organ ofthe competition system as it is stated under Art.33 that provides the federal
appellate tribunal is hereby established.l " For instance, as it is indicated under Art.32 of the
proclamation by itself speaks a lot on denoting' Adjudicative Benches of the Authority'. 135 The
adjudicative benches of the Authority are under the mandate of the Authority. 136 But unlike the
Adjudicative Benches of the Authority the Federal Appellate Tribunal, at least, its name
indicates that as it is separated and independent institution from the Authority. 137
Independence comprises automatic funding of the institution in question, without having to
depend on the whims of other organ ofthe government. Budget allocation and administration, on
the other hand, can be a manifestation for judicial independence.v" But the law under Art.30 (12)
clearly states that the appellate tribunal shall receive secretarial and other services from the
Authority. Therefore, this implies the independence of the appellate tribunal is absurd without its
own funding or budget. 139 Generally, other organs of the Authority are under the direct mandate
of the Authority and one cannot speak about independence and also the law by itself does not
grant independence for these (investigative, prosecution and adjudicative benches of the
134 . Interview with Ato Kochito Gebre Mariam, a presiding judge of the Federal Appellate Tribunal, Addis
Ababa, May, 8/2015.
135 . Ibid
136. Ibid
137 . Ibid
138. Ibid
139. Ibid
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Authority) organs but for the Federal Appellate Tribunal autonomy is a necessary condition to
ensure that businessmen and other stakeholders have confidence and respect for the Tribunal. 140
4.3.2. 'De-facto' Independence
If members of the executive give instructions to representatives of the competition Authority,
this is interpreted as a sign that they are not independent. The' same holds if decisions by the
competition Authorities are overridden by the executive. According to the practical situation
witness till nobody whether the executive or other third parties tried to give instructions and
overridden the decisions given by the Authority or by the Appellate Tribunal. In fact, it does not
mean that in factual condition the Authority or the Appellate Tribunal is not susceptible to
manipulation. 141 In case of budget and other logistics the organs of the Authority are dependent
on the Authority itself. One cannot say that this phenomenon rests its effect on the independence
directly or indirectly.Y Thus the main aspect of independence, which is usually considered part
of operational autonomy, relates to the source and allocation of budget. The concern here is "the
use of budgetary restrictions as a way of curtailing or penalizing enforcement'v'V Therefore,
especially, the budget dependence of the various organs of the Authority and also the Authority's
fmancial dependence on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), i.e. the
executive, have negative impact on the de-facto independence.
4.4. Tribunal Judges professional independence
Independence of judges concerned, other than form of appointment 144, accountability, tenure145
and the like, administration of judges plays a greater role. In addition to this the tenets of justice
140. Supra note cited at 134.
141 . Interview with Ato Tesfaye Neway, a Presiding judge of the Adjudicative Bench of the Authority, May,
8/2015, Addis Ababa.
142. Ibid
143. Supra note cited at 12, p.96.
144 . For instance, it is hypothesized that appointment through one important member of the executive (e.g.,
the prime minister or president) is less conducive to independence than appointment procedures that provide
for the participation of representatives of more than one government branch. See also, Stefan voigt cited
above at note 36. As per Art.35 of the proclamation, the appointment of judges whether it be for the
Adjudicative Benches or Federal Appellate Tribunal is appointed by the Prime Minister of the country.
145. It is further conjectured that the legal term length of the competition officer is another important variable
for the independence of the Authority. It is assumed that they are most independent if they are appointed for
life (or up to a mandatory retirement age) and cannot be removed from office, save by legal procedure. In this
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requires whether it be judges or panelist to be independent and impartial. Simply stated, judicial
independence is the ability of a judge to decide a matter free from pressures or inducements.i'"
This independence means that the individual judges deciding particular cases must be able to
exercise their professional responsibilities without being influenced by the Executive, the
Legislature or any other inappropriate sources. The individual judges have a right to enjoy
independence in carrying out their professional duties. This independence does not mean, of
course, that the judges can decide cases on the basis of their own whims or preferences: but they
have both a right and a duty to decide the cases before them according to the law, free from fear
of personal criticism or reprisals of any kind.
In this regard the Ethiopian competition proclamation concerned it divides two types of tribunal
judges under the competition regime. These are the adjudicative benches of the Authority's
judges and the Federal Appellate Tribunal judges. Both groups of judges shall be legally
independent of any interference or instructions by any person with regard to cases they
adjudicate.l'" But the adjudicative bench of the Authority concerned the case become different.
Judges to the adjudicative benches are under the control ofthe Authority because on its inception
that the bench is solely under the mandate of the Authority.l'" The adjudicative benches are
established under the mandate of the Authority. Therefore, the number of adjudicative benches
and the necessary logistics are determined and given by the Authority. 149 The General Director
(GD) of the Authority, as it is clearly indicated under the proclamation, shall direct and
administer and also inspect whether the adjudicative benches are working under the boundary of
the proclamation or not. ISO
Moreover, the judges of the federal appellate tribunal like the judges of adjudicative benches of
the Authority are legally free from any interference on the case they are adjudicating. Still
regard, our competition proclamation does not say anything about the tenure of the tribunal judges.
Additionally, Competition officers are further assumed to be less independent if terms are renewable because
they have an incentive to please those who can reappoint them. See also, Stefan Voigt cited above
146 . Justice F. B. William Kelly, An Independent Judiciary: The Core of the Rule of Law, p.3. available at,
http://search.myway.com/ searchl GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=the+ function+of+judicial +independence+in+
modem+legal+system+pdf, (accessed date, Mar. 20,2015)
147 . Supra note 141.
148. Ibid
149 . Ibid
150. Ibid
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administratively and in cases of budget allocation they are under the mandate of the Authority.
Especially, administratively the judges of both tribunals relationship with the GD of the
Authority are not clear. According to Ato Kochito GlMariam, a presiding judge of the Federal
Appellate Tribunal, the administrative relationship of the judges with the DG ofthe Authority is
not clear under the proclamation. The accountability of the appellate tribunal is also not
indicated.i'" The judges to the tribunal are appointed by the Prime Minster of the country,
however, the proclamation is not as such clear regarding to administrative and discipline issues
of these judges.152 These cases on its own directly or indirectly have impact on the independence
of judgcs.l'" Currently, judges of both tribunals are claiming about governance issues within the
Authority.V" Appointees are not governed by the civil servant proclamation so that judges
whether it be adjudicative benches or appellate tribunal should be governed with its own self-
contained rules and regulations. 155These rules and regulations in its part may include issues like
disciplinary responsibilities, resignation, promotion, allowances and so forth.156 Moreover, it
may also indicate for which organ that the judges are accountable.i'" This absence of self-
contained rules and regulation about administration of judges under the Authority at least
indirectly lays its shadow on job guarantee ofthe judges.':" Therefore, this in turn has impact on
the independence of the judges. 159
4.5. Consolidation of Power in light of Fairness
From a strictly legal point of view, the combination of all powers, i.e. investigation, prosecution
and adjudication, within one institution raises the question of the compatibility of competition
law proceedings led by the Authority with the fundamental right to a fair trial as enshrined under
the FDRE Constitution. Traditionally, one can think that, it is sufficient for the Authority's
Adjudicative benches decisions in competition cases to be subject to review by the Federal
Appellate Tribunal or the decisions of the Appellate Tribunal is subject to review in case of error
151 . Supra note 134.
152 . Ibid
153 . Ibid
154. Ibid
155 . Ibid
156. Ibid
157. Ibid
158. Ibid
159. Ibid
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of law by the Federal Supreme Court, even if the Authority itself is not an "independent and
impartial tribunal". But nowadays competition Authorities are entertaining cases160that amounts
up to in million Birr and the judicial review of the Ethiopian competition regime concerned the
appeal system follows on 'mistake of law' not 'fact finding'. Thus competition cases are high-
stakes matters for the parties involved, in which treble damages, a desired merger, or perhaps
their economic viability is at risk. For this reason, the parties have an incentive to retain quality
fairness. 161Therefore, absence of fairness in the course of competition proceeding will have
negative impact on the regime and generally on the market system of the country.
In case-by-case decision-making, integrated agencies, raise systemic concerns that the
integration of investigation, enforcement (prosecution), and adjudicative functions create bias or
lack of objectivity ("confirmation bias,,)162,or the appearance of it, in the discharge of the
adjudicatory functions vested in the agencies. At least in perception, integration of these
functions may render the agencies "judges in their own cause." There are avenues by which these
concerns can be and have been addressed even within the integrated agency format. For example,
the agency can sharply separate investigative and enforcement functions from the adjudicative
functions through use of different personnel and through firewalls, But practically under the
Ethiopian competition Authority, for instance, the investigation and prosecution organs are
administered by investigation and prosecution directorate directed by the director of the
directorate. Above the director the deputy GD and the GD of the Authority hierarchically
mandate the activities of the Directorate. Even the Adjudicative benches of the Authority are
under the direction and mandates of the Authority.
160 . Currently, the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority's Adjudicative Bench is
entertaining competition cases, for instance, Addis Ababa Foam and Plastic factory Vs. New Flower General
Trading plc, the case amounts Birr 3 million and 689 thousands, Elsan impex Vs. Gad Electro-mechanical plc
which amounts Birr 1.6 million, Hurts pIc Vs. Bayer Crone on which the cases amounts Birr 1 million and
823 thousands. The first two cases are pending cases till May, 29/2015, and the last case that is indicated as an
example received its final decision by the Adjudicative bench of the Authority.
161 . The OECD Policy Roundtables, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law, 1996, p.116. available at
http://search.myway.com/search/ GGmain.jhtml?searchfor=competition+policy%2C +consumer+protectio
n%2C+and+economic+disadvantage+pdf, (accessed at, Mar.22, 2015)
162 . Confirmation bias entails a person's readiness to accept the version of a story that confirms his or her
pre-existing beliefs. See Wouter Wils, The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial
Function and the Adjudicative Function, 27 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 202,215 (2004)
as cited by Eleanor M. Fox et al, at note 68.
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Whether the Adjudicative benches of the Authority or the Federal Appellate Tribunals are for all
practical judicial matter are acting like regular courts. Even the appointees of these Tribunals are
previously judges of supreme courts and high courts of respective regions. But currently after the
appointment they are judges to the tribunals of the competition Authority and the Appellate
Tribunal no more connection with their previous post. For this end there should be separation
and independence because the rule of law so requires. At the end of the Eighteenth Century
Locke, who strongly influenced the English Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution of
1776, stated that established laws with the right to appeal to independent judges are essential to a
civilized society and that societies without them are still "in a state of nature". At the core of
these and more modern concepts of judicial independence is the theory of separation of powers:
that the judiciary should function independently of the legislative and executive arms of
government. 163 The tenets of procedural rule of law also command that an independent organ
di di iustifi bl 164a JU icates JUStlia e matters.
4.6. Check and Balance
4.6.1. Internal check and balance
Due process and rights of defense remain guaranteed by a fully fledged system of internal checks
and balances. Competition cases are launched and prosecuted by the Investigation Services
acting under the direction of the investigation and prosecution directorate with no involvement of
the Adjudicative Benches of the Authority whatsoever in the Ethiopian competition system. The
Adjudicative Bench (currently it is single bench with only three judges) then adjudicates all
aspects of the case, with no involvement at all by the Investigation Services in the decision-
making process. In fact, this separation of tasks, though it is under the control of the GD of the
Authority, has proved extremely beneficial because it guarantees an intense debate both with the
parties and within the organization that ultimately leads to rich, strong, and fair decisions.
According to Ato Yosef Getachew investigation and prosecution directorate director, the
investigation or prosecution does not follow a specialized procedure in the course of
163. Supra note 146.
164. Supra note cited at 12, p.83.
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investigation but simply conduct investigation like any investigation done by investigative
police.l'" Something different from the regular police investigation is that the directorate
conducts investigation especially of market and economic issues.l'" Simple cases may be
investigated at personal level but cases that seem complex and needs more attention are
investigated within a team. When complaints arise from individuals there is no a special
committee or body to hear the complaints of the individual but there is a committee at deputy
GD level of the Authority to hear administrative complaints.l'" In fact, this body may not
entertain cases related with professional misbehaviors in cases when investigation is
conducted.l'" As we have discussed the France experience under chapter three the Hearing
Officer like committee at least to control the internal check and balance is no organized under the
Ethiopian competition regime. The Hearing Officer is therefore a procedural expert who can
follow the investigative process and help resolve issues as they arise before providing feedback
to the College under the France experience. Likewise under the consolidated format of the
investigation and prosecution organs it needs more internal check and balance within the
Directorate.
The Adjudicative Benches of the Authority concerned, at least checked by the Federal Appellate
Tribunal with the procedure of appeal as it clearly stated under Art.33 (2) b of the proclamation.
But as the investigation and prosecution tasks of the Authority, especially, in cases of
investigation the investigation officer shall take various measures like search and seizure. For
this end there should be a stricter format of internal check and balance within the Authority. This
means, there should be a real and strong check and balance between the investigation organ and
prosecution organ. There should be a capacity for the prosecution organ to refuse cases from
enforcing due to its un-procedural investigation of the investigator, ifany.
4.6.2. External check and balance
Independent agencies are expected to be subject to government oversight and a system of checks
and balances. In most jurisdictions, legislators elect to police by judicial review. It is widely held
165. An interview made with Ato Yosef Getachew, Director, investigation and prosecution directorate of the
Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority, May,6/2015, Addis Ababa.
166. Ibid
167 . Ibid
168 . Ibid
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that independent judicial review of the decisions of competition authorities, whether through the
regular courts or through administrative tribunals, is desirable for the sake of the fairness and
integrity of the decision-making process. Most jurisdictions appear to favor a procedural review
of competition cases whereby the appeal body confines itself to a consideration of the law,
including a review of procedures adopted by competition authorities in the exercise of their
investigative and decision-making functions, rather than a consideration de novo of both
evidence and legal arguments. Accordingly, the intention is not for the courts to substitute their
own appreciation, but to ascertain whether the competition authority has abused its discretionary
powers.
In this regard too, the Ethiopian trade competition and consumer protection proclamation seems
follow the same path. Accordingly, any party that claims the existence of mistake on question of
law regarding a decision passed pursuant to Art.33 (3) ofthe proclamation may lodge his appeal
to the federal Supreme Court. Even if the law guarantees external check and balance by way of
judicial review, it is not free from problems. Firstly, currently the Federal Appellate Tribunal
comprises a single bench with only three judges. All judges to the appellate tribunal are simply
law professionals no other staffs are included with other profession like economics, business and
the like. This implies that no other reason makes the tribunal special from the regular court of
law, i.e. the appellate Federal Supreme Court in cases of appeal in mistake law or fact save as the
Federal Supreme Court is the place where external check and balance out of the Authority is
exercised. Secondly, as it is discussed above the structural independence ofthe appellate tribunal
is debatable and in 'de facto' the tribunal is not independent. The International Competition
Network (lCN, 2003) asserts that structures of decision-making in which the investigative and
adjudicative processes are strictly separated are more likely to pass muster at judicial review than
are systems in which the exercise of these functions is conflated. Having these problems the
appeal to the federal Supreme Court is only entertained on mistake of law. Being at its infant
stage, the Ethiopian competition system needs more and more improvements. According to an
interview made with Ato Kochito Gebre Mariam, a presiding judge for the Federal Appellate
Tribunal, For instance, the appellate tribunal is not well staffed. Still personnel with various
expertise knowledge like economics and business, are not available.l'" In cases where the
169. Supra note 134.
57
Tribunal needs the help ofthese personnels, according to the civil procedure code of the country,
it orders the expertise witness whom may be an economist or a person with business
know ledge.17o
Beginning from the establishment of the appellate tribunal till now due to a limited number case
flow to the knowledge of the presiding judge of the appellate tribunal no appeal is claimed to the
Federal Supreme Court. 171
4.7. Conclusion and Recommendation
Competition laws are applied all over the world. While at their core they exhibit a high degree of
similarity, variations abound on substantive and institutional aspects, and even on the specific
goals to be furthered by them. Nowadays all world countries are enacted competition laws due to
its constructive importance. Competition laws are intended to ensure that the marketplace is
competitive and is not distorted by anticompetitive practices. Due to this crucial importance
governments are taking initiatives to have a competition policy. Competition policy is generally
regarded as that of set of public policy tools that lay the foundations for a market economy by
allowing for the efficient allocation of resources.
Although countries are in need of having a refined competition policy and law, they have been
also engaged in identifying various objectives that should be included under the specific
competition law and policy. The main objective of a competition law and policy is economic
efficiency. But apart from consideration of economic efficiency, governments do have other
socio-economic and even political objectives through the regime of competition system.
As far as their importance necessitates competition laws are enacted to be implemented.
Implementation of competition law concerned the next worry of the countries may be what the
institutional framework or design of the Authority/commission/agency look like. Competition
law implementing institutions are designed due to the countries factual situation. In fact, there
170. Supra note 134.
171 .Ibid
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are a wide variety of institutional designs in which competition Authorities operate. Accordingly,
currently global trend of institutional design of competition Authorities/agencies or commission
identified three models. These include the bifurcated judicial, bifurcated agency/tribunal and
integrated agency models. These models are the popular and applied in various world countries
and jurisdictions in pure and mixed format.
Ethiopia being a new practitioner for the competition regime enacted the first consolidated
competition law the Trade Practice in 2003. Before the introduction of this proclamation, the
country was used to govern competition like cases by the old-aged the 1960s civil and
commercial codes. Historically, before and after 1974, the country does not have a consolidated
type of competition law. Even after 1974 the coming of 'Derg' to the power nearly all economic
system was controlled by the government and due to the socialist form of economic system
competition in the market cannot be envisaged.
After the downfall of the 'Derg' regime and the coming power of the EPRDF, the economic
policy of the country changed from the socialist oriented policy to free market economy. Due to
this economic ideology shuffle successive enactment of competition laws since 2003. Beginning
by the Trade Practice Proclamation of the 2003, the Trade Practice and Consumer Protection
Proclamation of the 2010 and currently the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection of the
2013 are the competition laws that are enacted at different time.
In fact, one can witness an important improvement of the later from the former. Objectively, for
instance, the first Trade Practice Proclamation does not include the notion of consumer
protection and other socio-economic and political objectives other than objectives of economic
efficiency. The Trade Practice and consumer protection Proclamation of the 2010 as a fully
fledged competition law come with a notion of consumer right protection and some structural
adjustment like separation power between the Authority and the then Ministry of Trade and
Industry (MoTI) compared with the Trade Practice Proclamation. Although the Trade Practice
and Consumer Protection made things to be improved, it is not free from some defects. Loose
appeal system, for instance, are the major stated defects ofthe Proclamation.
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The repealed Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation witnessed an important
procedural requirement. Accordingly, it was apportioned or separated power between two
separate organs, i.e. MoTI and the Authority, investigative and adjudicative power respectively.
This was considered advisable at least for the matter of check and balance between the
institutions. Also it was seen as a good move for expertise specialization so that procedures
followed in these two separate powers are distinct.
But under the Proclamation in enforce these issues stated above are denied. Under its
institutional set-up the proclamation tried to frame a mixed format of those different models of
institutional designs popularly known on worldwide. Accordingly, it consolidated all powers
including investigation, prosecution and adjudication in the hands of the Authority. In this
context, the Ethiopian Competition Authority seems tailored with the Integrated Agency Model.
Under this type of model, a single specialized agency undertakes investigative, enforcement and
adjudicative functions. The assumed institution for this type of model is the Ethiopian
Competition Authority. The Authority with an integrated agency model represents an agency
with a double mission: responsibilities for the enforcement of both competition law and
consumer protection law. In the enforcement of competition cases, on the other hand, save as the
Federal Appellate Tribunal's being a specialized competition Tribunal, the Authority is required
to go to this specialized competition tribunal. In this context, the Authority is modeled in the
Bifurcated Agency/Tribunal Model. In the enforcement of criminal penalty, the Authority seems
tailored with other type of model, i.e. the Bifurcated Judicial Model. As what is required by this
model, the Authority is obliged to go to regular courts for the enforcement of the competition
law by imposing criminal penalty by the competent court through its prosecutors.
Moreover, other than the adoption a mixed format of institutional set-up, the Proclamation does
not make things clear with administration of the tribunal Judges of the adjudicative benches and
the appellate tribunal. Also other than establishing the Federal Appellate Tribunal, the
Proclamation is silent about the independence of the tribunal structurally and accountability of
judges including the judges ofthe adjudicative benches of the Authority.
Though the proclamation established the Authority as an autonomous institution, it does not
make independent organs of investigation, prosecution and adjudication. All organs are under the
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mandate of the Authority. No check and balance mechanism within the organs of the Authority,
especially, between the investigative and prosecution organs experienced. However, there is a
check and balance between the adjudicative benches of the Authority and investigation; it seems
not realistic and effective due to their control under the same Authority. The same conclusion
will be furnished to the interaction between the Adjudicative benches of the Authority and the
Federal Appellate Tribunal. By and large, laws of those countries selected and discussed as a
comparative analysis in this paper show that an organ enshrined for the tasks of adjudication
should be made independent. The tenet of procedural laws and the rule of law oblige that any
organ engaged of the task of adjudication should be independent and impartial. In this regard, for
instance, Competition Act of 1998 of the Republic of South Africa established independent
Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court (CAC).
Independence, in most cases, is realized by budgetary and other logistics independence. Also
accountability is the other aspect of independence. But under the Ethiopian competition regime
independence for the separated organs of the Authority seems not given a due concern. As a
result, it left the tribunal judges accountability and administration issues within the Authority
unclear. This in turn this created a problem directly or indirectly on the independence of the
judges, though, the de-jure independence provides that the tribunal judges are independent from
any undue influence and order of the executives or other third parties.
Moreover, the Authority itself faces the problem of independence. It is known that as there is a
trade-off between independence and accountability. This trade-off generally deemed desirable
because it ensures that the competition authority does not stray from the agenda set by the
legislature. When accountability perceived to be high, there is increased willingness to concede
greater discretion and independence and the opposite will be evident when there is loose
accountability.
Under the proclamation, though, the Authority is accountable to the MoT, it does not make
things clear in what manner the accountability workout. Therefore, on the above premise of the
trade-off between independence and accountability it has an impact on the independence of the
Authority.
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The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation consolidated power of
investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the single roof of the Authority. This
consolidation of power under the Authority without a set-up of independent organizational
structure and accountability procedurally affects faire treatment of individuals and it has also
create a problem of check and balance between the organs of the Authority. Unless a check and
balance system in a specific regime is not maintained well, then it shall derogate the principle of
rule oflaw.
The nature of competition law needs a higher tendency of enforcement capacity. So if properly
institutionally framed/designed, competition Authorities by enforcing a competition law very
well facilitates economic efficiency and consumer right protection in the country. But if the
accountability of the Authority are not clearly defmed in a manner that realizes the
independence/autonomy of the Authority from the executive, i.e. the MoT; if the proclamation
consolidated all the powers of investigation, prosecution and adjudication to a single institution
(the Authority) and derogates the tenet of procedural laws, i.e. the principles of fairness and rule
of law; if the law does not guarantee the organizational independence like the experiences of
other jurisdictions; if the judicial organs under the Authority are not made independent and also
the accountability of judges are not defined; ifthe administration of tribunal judges whether it be
the adjudicative benches of the Authority or the Federal Appellate Tribunal are not clear and
their job guarantee is at risk; if the adjudicative benches of the Authority and the Federal
Appellate Tribunal are not structurally and budgetary independent, how can the regime 0 f
competition and the institution established for the enforcement of this law gain confidence from
the public in general and help the country's economic development by addressing market
economic efficiency and consumer right protection?
In order to frame or design a competition Authority that realizes economic efficiency and
protects consumers from misleading market actors by fully fledged enforcement capacity,
Ethiopia needs an ideal competition law that addresses the above questions. Accordingly, the
paper submits the following recommendation as a point for consideration:
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1. The Authority's both de-jure and de-facto independence should be clearly stated by
defming the accountability in expressed manner;-. -
2. The organs under the Authority including; investigative, prosecution and adjudicative
organs should be established independently. In doing so, check and balance and fairness
and shall be addressed;
3. Establishing an independent Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection
Appellate Tribunal with its own budget and logistics and structurally shall be attached to
the regular courts of the country. Accordingly, the administration of judges to the
Tribunal shall be made in line with the administration of the regular courts to the
Tribunal's counter jurisdiction/structure;
4. Inclusion of a separated law that govern the administration of tribunal judges to the
Adjudicative Benches of the Authority; and
5. Creating a check and balance system, especially, between the investigation and
prosecution organs and generally within the organs of the Authority.
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ANNEX I
Interview Guides Prepared for the Ethiopian Trade Competition and
Consumer Protection Authority
Personal Detail of Respondent
Name ofthe Respondent (ifhe or she consented) _
Position in the Authority _
Type of the Study: A Master Thesis in Law (LL.M Thesis)
Title: Evaluating Issues Related With Consolidation of Investigation, Prosecution and
Adjudication Powers under the Ethiopian Competition Authority: A Comparative Analysis
Objective of this Interview: to gather information so as to evaluate the effects of issues of
independence and accountability of various organs in the Authority, check and balance system
within the organs, fairness and administration of tribunal judges including the Federal Appellate
Tribunal under the Authority in relation with a consolidation powers of investigation,
prosecution and adjudication under the Authority and to suggest possible solutions based on the
findings.
So, you are kindly re quested to respond to the interviews as your information will be helpful for
effective accomplishment of the study and as it will be kept confidential and analyzed
anonymously unless you consented for the disclosure of your identity and personal views.
Thank you, in advance, for your co-operation!!
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Guiding Questions: (for the Authority)
1. The Authority being a specialized agency entrusted with enforcement of the Trade
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013. The law entitled the
Authority all the powers like investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of competition
case. In fact, these powers are enforced by a distinct expertise Knowledge and needs a
clear separation between them, because the tenet of procedural law so requires. So, what
measures or actions are has taken by the Authority in order to maintain the independence
and a check and balance system within the organs the Authority? In what manner the
accountability of the Adjudicative benches ofthe Authority is maintained?
2. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 does not
clearly state about the administration of judges including the Trade Competition and
Consumer Protection Federal Appellate Tribunal judges. Therefore, in this factual
situation how will be the relationship between the tribunal judges and the higher officials
of the Authority including the Director General of the Authority is governed?
3. What actions are taken to maintain the separation of organs of investigation and
prosecution for check and balance system within the organs to be realized?
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ANNEX II
Interview Guides Prepared for the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection Appellate Tribunal
Personal Detail of Respondent
Name of the Respondent (ifhe or she consented) _
Position in the Tribunal-----------------
Type ofthe Study: A Master Thesis in Law (LL.M Thesis)
Title: Evaluating Issues Related With Consolidation of Investigation, Prosecution and
Adjudication Powers under the Ethiopian Competition Authority: A Comparative Analysis
Objective of this Interview: to gather information so as to evaluate the factual independence
and external check and balance in the competition system and accountability of Federal Trade
Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal, and administration of tribunal judges
in relation with a consolidation powers of investigation, prosecution and adjudication under the
Authority and to suggest possible solutions based on the findings.
So, you are kindly re quested to respond to the interviews as your information will be helpful for
effective accomplishment of the study and as it will be kept confidential and analyzed
anonymously unless you consented for the disclosure of your identity and personal views.
Thank you, in advance, for your co-operation!!
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Guiding Questions: (for the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection Appellate Tribunal)
1. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 established
the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal. But it does
not made the Tribunal independent in budgetary and other logistics and administration of
its employees. So, how will be the legal and factual structural independence of the
Tribunal from the Authority is maintained?
2. Has there been any challenge faced like disciplinary issues in the course of adjudicating
cases by the tribunal judges? Yes__ No_. If yes, in what manner such challenge is
overcome?
3. To whom the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal
judges are accountable administratively?
4. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 states that
secretarial support is given by the Authority to Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate
Tribunal does not have its own budget. Does this absence of budgetary and other logistic
independence have impact on the impartial adjudication of cases of the Tribunal? Yes__
, No_. If yes, how can such challenges is manifested?
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ANNEX III
Interview Guides Prepared for the Ministry of Trade
Personal Detail of Respondent
Name ofthe Respondent (if he or she consented) _
Position in the Ministry _
Type of the Study: A Master Thesis in Law (LL.M Thesis)
Title: Evaluating Issues Related With Consolidation of Investigation, Prosecution and
Adjudication Powers under the Ethiopian Competition Authority: A Comparative Analysis
Objective of this Interview: to gather information in order to evaluate the effect of unexpressed
accountability of the Authority to the Ministry of Trade impact on the de-jure
autonomous/independence ofthe Authority.
So, you are kindly re quested to respond to the interviews as your information will be helpful for
effective accomplishment of the study and as it will be kept confidential and analyzed
anonymously unless you consented for the disclosure of your identity and personal views.
Thank you, in advance, for your co-operation]!
73
Guiding Questions: (for the Ministry of Trade)
1. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 established
an autonomous Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority. Even if the
Authority is an autonomous competition law enforcing institution it is accountable to the
Ministry of Trade. In which functions of the Authority is accountable to the MoT? Save
as the MoT being one ofa service seeker of the Authority on some competition cases rest
on the jurisdiction of the Ministry, how will be the legal autonomous status of the
Authority is realized?
2. In what listed manner the accountability ofthe Authority is expressed?
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Guiding Questions: (for the Authority)
1. The Authority being a specialized agency entrusted with enforcement of the Trade
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013. The law entitled the
Authority all the powers like investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of competition
case. In fact, these powers are enforced by a distinct expertise Knowledge and needs a
clear separation between them, because the tenet of procedural law so requires. So, what
measures or actions are has taken by the Authority in order to maintain the independence
and a check and balance system within the organs the Authority? In what manner the
accountability of the Adjudicative benches ofthe Authority is maintained?
2. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 does not
clearly state about the administration of judges including the Trade Competition and
Consumer Protection Federal Appellate Tribunal judges. Therefore, in this factual
situation how will be the relationship between the tribunal judges and the higher officials
of the Authority including the Director General of the Authority is governed?
3. What actions are taken to maintain the separation of organs of investigation and
prosecution for check and balance system within the organs to be realized?
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Guiding Questions: (for the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer
Protection Appellate Tribunal)
1. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 established
the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal. But it does
not made the Tribunal independent in budgetary and other logistics and administration of
its employees. So, how will be the legal and factual structural independence of the
Tribunal from the Authority is maintained?
2. Has there been any challenge faced like disciplinary issues in the course of adjudicating
cases by the tribunal judges? Yes__ No_. If yes, in what manner such challenge is
overcome?
3. To whom the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate Tribunal
judges are accountable administratively?
4. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.81312013 states that
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Guiding Questions: (for the Ministry of Trade)
1. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No.813/2013 established
an autonomous Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority. Even if the
Authority is an autonomous competition law enforcing institution it is accountable to the
Ministry of Trade. In which functions of the Authority is accountable to the MoT? Save
as the MoT being one ofa service seeker of the Authority on some competition cases rest
on the jurisdiction of the Ministry, how will be the legal autonomous status of the
Authority is realized?
2. In what listed manner the accountability of the Authority is expressed?
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